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CHAPTER 1
THE ROLE OF HEALTH IN ECONOMIC GROWTH: THEORY AND
EVIDENCE FROM THE 20TH CENTURY
1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
What kind of relationship does health and economic growth exhibit worldwide? While
many economists have looked at the subject, results still remain relatively inconclusive.
The past, underlying consensus appears to show that income growth is dependent on im-
proving health, and its effects can be quite large. For example, Gallup and Sachs (2001)
estimate that eradicating malaria in Sub-Saharan Africa could potentially increase the re-
gion’s per-capita income by as much as 2.6 percentage points per year. Other studies such
as Almond (2006), Cutler, Deaton, and Lleras-Muney (2006), Bleakley (2007), and Beach,
Ferrie, Saavedra, and Troesken (2014) complement these findings, showing that disease
prevention and eradication not only enhances an individual’s educational attainment but
also leads to substantial gains in income later in life. The World Health Organization
(WHO) (2006) provides, perhaps, the starkest parallel, finding that poor health adversely
affects individual’s social and economic well-being, increases inequality, lowers household
income, stunts economic development, and harms international security. As a result, the
WHO has made improving health worldwide as one of its main goals and objectives due
the wide range of benefits it can potentially provide.
Recently, however, there has been a growing concern that improving health may actu-
ally play little to no role in raising incomes worldwide. An influential paper by Acemoglu
and Johnson (2007) finds that the major improvements made in health over the last century
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caused the world’s population to grow more rapidly than incomes, which consequently led
to decreases in GDP per capita worldwide. Furthermore, Becker, Philipson, and Soares
(2005), Cervellati and Sunde (2011), and Hansen (2013) argue that the greatest impacts
of improving health do not occur in raising incomes but lie in other avenues of economic
development, such as bolstering overall social welfare and increasing human capital out-
comes. Thus, these studies conclude that the health and wealth relationship is especially
weak. This ambiguity in the results invariably creates problems for policymakers, who
look to these studies as guidelines to set forth plans with the direct purposes of inducing
economic growth. Since health is an indicator that can be targeted relatively easily and is
a subject that encompasses both developed and developing countries, it is a topic that re-
mains important for discussion and analysis, even if it has no bearing on income outcomes,
as there may be benefits elsewhere.
One reason why the literature has been so divided is due to differing theoretical spec-
ifications. Since there is no standardized model, there is a need to establish a framework
that can accurately capture and measure health’s impact on economic growth. Thus, this
paper looks to disentangle the health and growth relationship by proposing and estimating
a simplified, unified theoretical framework based in modern endogenous growth theory. By
taking a production function which is dependent on health, and introducing technology that
diffuses according to a Nelson-Phelps (1966) approach, the framework suggests that both
life expectancy growth rates and initial levels of life expectancy are the main components
of economic growth changes worldwide. This provides a new theoretical model in which
to view the health and economic growth relationship, which has not yet been seen in the
literature. It takes into account the potential omitted-variable biases that may occur in Ace-
moglu and Johnson (2007) as argued in Bloom, Canning, and Fink (2013) and the lags and
dynamics that Acemoglu and Johnson (2014) offer as a counterargument to Bloom et al..
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This leads to a model which shows that economic growth is dependent on two similar, yet
distinct, measures of health.
I complement the theory with an empirical analysis, following a similar approach used
by Krueger and Lindahl (2001), who perform a related exercise, looking instead at the ef-
fect of education on economic growth. I restrict my attention to the 20th century, focusing
on periods before the international epidemiological transition (1900-1940)1 and periods
after the transition (1940-2000)2 using both ordinary least squares (OLS) and two-stage
least squares instrumental variable (IV) estimation. In order to address concerns about en-
dogeneity, I utilize Acemoglu and Johnson’s (2007) instrument of predicted mortality and
Lorentzen, McMillan, and Wacziarg’s (2008) instruments of geography, climate, and the
Malaria Ecology Index into the estimations. Combining these instruments together, I find
that both life expectancy growth rates and changes in the life expectancy growth rates pos-
itively and significantly contribute to the rise in per-capita income growth rates worldwide
in both the pre- and post-intervention periods. The results confirm the theoretical predic-
tions of the model and provides some reconciliation to the existing literature. The results
also imply that the population expansion that occurred in response to the improvements in
health may not be as large as the previous literature suggests, and that the gains in incomes
outweigh the increases in population, as opposed to the outcomes found in Young (2005)
and Acemoglu and Johnson (2007).
The outline for the rest of the paper is as follows: Section 1.2 provides a review of
the literature, which focuses on both the theoretical and empirical aspects of the topic.
Section 1.3 presents the theoretical framework of the model, while Section 1.4 details the
empirical methodologies and the OLS results. A discussion of the IV strategy and the first-
and second-stage IV results is also detailed in this section, which is presented alongside
1Also called the pre-intervention period.
2Also called the post-intervention period.
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an analysis of the population dynamics. Section 1.5 concludes and provides avenues for
further research.
1.2 Literature Review
1.2.1 Economic Mechanisms
Most theories suggest that health should be growth-enhancing, and the mechanisms through
which this growth occurs is relatively clear. One primary channel that is discussed exten-
sively in the literature is productivity. Intuitively, healthier individuals suffer from fewer
lost work days from illness, are more energetic and robust (both physically and mentally),
and better adapt to changing environments and technologies than their unhealthy coun-
terparts. The culmination of all of these effects leads to more efficient and productive
workers. These findings are documented in Strauss and Thomas (1998) and Bloom and
Canning (2000) for a variety of countries worldwide. Greater exposure to illness and dis-
ability reduces wages and productivity substantially in the workplace which, in turn, stunts
economic growth and development.
Another mechanism through which health can be seen as growth augmenting exists
through individual’s savings behavior. De Nardi, French, and Jones (2009) posit that as
life spans increase, an individual’s savings preferences change, leading to higher savings
rates and faster rates of asset accumulation. These new funds are then channeled into two
possible avenues: (1) investments in human capital or (2) investments in physical capital.
Investments in human capital typically lead to increased spending in education. Zhang,
Zhang, and Lee (2003) develop a general equilibrium model which suggests that individu-
als with longer life expectancies have greater incentive to invest in education, as developing
their skill repertoire allows them to reap the benefits of such ventures over a longer period
of time. A more educated workforce spurs technological innovation and adoption, which
combined with the labor productivity effect, is growth-inducing. Along the same lines, in-
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dividuals may also want to take their increased savings and invest in physical capital which
increases capital-labor ratios and, thus, per-capita incomes, as exemplified in Barro (2013).
Finally, better health often paves the way for the demographic transition, which changes
the population structure of an economy. Although there are several variants of how the tran-
sition progresses, Lee (2003) and Galor (2005) provide two of the most widely accepted
views in the literature. The first stage of the transition generally starts with the onset of
better health caused by changes in tastes and preferences regarding current health and agri-
cultural practices (e.g. improvements in food supply and sanitation, better nutrition habits,
increased personal hygiene, etc.) or medical advances (e.g. availability of new technolo-
gies, access to basic health care, improved education, etc.). With better health in the coun-
try, life spans also increase, which, combined with the increased emphasis on education
and the reduced value in children’s work, decreases the need for more offspring. These
changes are shown in the next stage which is first characterized with mortality reductions,
then followed by a fertility decline decades later. The lag between these phases causes the
population to swell with young individuals (compared to the old). As the population gets
younger and as more of these individuals enter the workforce, the ratio of the working-age
population to dependents (e.g. children and the elderly) reaches a peak. Due to the sheer
amount of working-age individuals in the economy, both income levels and the standard of
living rise, as the “demographic dividend” is reaped.
These past studies present an important fact: there are two similar, yet separate ap-
proaches in which to view health as a form of human capital. The first view, based on
Lucas (1988) and Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992), views health as a regular factor of
production. Accordingly, per-capita income should be associated with the accumulation or
growth of health, as seen in the savings and demographic transition effects listed above. The
second approach, based on Nelson and Phelps (1966), would argue that a higher level or
stock of health should spur growth by facilitating technological innovations and advances
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and is often observed in the productivity channels in the literature. These two differences
are typically not readily seen in the literature, and are often substituted for one another,
even though they measure two distinctive variables, each with its own idiosyncratic effects.
To provide a bit of reconciliation between these two theories, my model combines these
two approaches in order to present a unified framework where each measure of health is
featured, and the impacts of both can be assessed.
1.2.2 Empirical Evidence
This branching off in the theory inevitably leads to some ambiguous and uncertain results.
The data confirms the theories and mechanisms only partially, and the overall effects are
rather inconclusive. The major empirical work delves into testing the mechanisms be-
hind the health and economic growth relationship, seeking to find out the primary channel
through which health works and, in turn, the impacts it has on incomes. Looking at stud-
ies devoted to the productivity aspect of improving health, the data appear to provide a
strong confirmation of the theory. Bloom, Canning, and Sevilla (2004) test this particu-
lar mechanism by employing a production function approach. Their results indicate that
a one-year improvement in a population’s life expectancy could potentially lead to a four
percent increase in output, mainly due to labor productivity gains. Exploiting cross-country
variation from 1960-1990, Barro (1998) comes to a similar conclusion, finding that GDP
growth rates are bolstered by higher levels of life expectancy mainly through productiv-
ity gains and through technological adoption and innovations, albeit with relatively lower
magnitudes.
There are also several studies devoted to testing the savings aspect of improving health.
Bloom, Canning, and Graham (2003) show that increases in life expectancy lead to higher
savings at every age, even when retirement is endogenous. They estimate that a ten-year
improvement in longevity is associated with a rise in the savings rate of about 4.5 per-
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centage points. Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) test this hypothesis using an augmented
Solow model, finding that countries with faster accumulation rates of human capital (health
and education) have higher savings rates and incomes in the steady state. Here, a one per-
cent increase in the human capital growth rate raises GDP per capita by about 0.75 percent.
However, by using lags of human capital growth rates as instruments for the human capi-
tal growth rate itself, Caselli, Esquivel, and Lefort (1996) reject Mankiw et al.’s findings,
showing that the inclusion of health in the estimations does not affect income growth in
any significant manner (although education still remains significant). Lorentzen, McMil-
lan, and Wacziarg (2008) offer another view in this area, suggesting that lower levels of
health reduce economic growth by shortening individual’s time horizons. They find that
individuals that are subjugated to a lower level of health (either by infectious diseases or
the environment) often make decisions that yield short-term benefits but have substantial
long-term costs. While several channels are explored in this paper (fertility choices, in-
vestments in physical capital, investments in education, etc.), the authors conclude that
the savings and asset accumulation aspects are the primary mechanisms affected by health
changes. Here, worse health causes individuals to value current consumption over future
consumption, driving down savings holdings. This leaves little resources for future gener-
ations, effectively stunting economic growth. Thus, improving health is positively related
with changes in people’s savings behavior, and in turn, with economic growth.
Finally, a more recent mechanism examined in the literature looks at health’s impacts
on population dynamics, which is the focus of this paper. I closely follow the work done
by Acemoglu and Johnson (2007), the critique Bloom, Canning, and Fink (2013) provide
to the paper, as well as the response Acemoglu and Johnson (2014) present defending
their position. Acemoglu and Johnson (2007) use major international health improvements
brought on by the international epidemiological transition to estimate the effect health has
on economic performance worldwide. Outlining a source of exogenous variation in life
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expectancy and using predicted mortality rates as an instrumental variable, they find that
a one percent increase in life expectancy growth rates leads to a two percent increase in
population, but an inconsequential rise in GDP. Thus, they find little to no evidence that
the large increases in life expectancies worldwide caused by the international epidemiolog-
ical transition raised per-capita incomes. Cervellati and Sunde (2011) extend Acemoglu
and Johnson’s work by breaking down the countries in their sample into two distinct cat-
egories: nations that have yet to experience the demographic transition (also known as
pre-transitional countries) and nations that have already gone through the transition (also
known as post-transitional countries).3 Using finite mixture models and testing for non-
monotonicity, Cervellati and Sunde come up with qualitatively and quantitatively similar
results as Acemoglu and Johnson. Bloom et al. (2013) take exception with these results,
arguing that the previous estimations suffer from omitted-variable bias since initial life
expectancies were not accounted for in the original analysis. The inclusion of this new
variable changes the results considerably, with improvements in health having a strong,
positive association with economic growth. Acemoglu and Johnson (2014) respond by de-
fending their work, saying that Bloom et al.’s work has no theoretical basis for their model
and, their estimations suffer from time-varying biases. In order to reconcile these empir-
ical results, I provide an empirical strategy which is most similar to Krueger and Lindahl
(2001), who explore the initial and growth effects of education on economic growth. I also
include methodologies used in both Acemoglu and Johnson and Bloom et al., taking their
views into consideration, which provides a new look into the health and economic growth
debate.
3Cervellati and Sunde use specific standards to categorize pre-transitional and post-transitional countries
at certain periods. The main criteria include: thresholds for life expectancies at birth and the crude birth rate
as well as the speed of decline of the fertility rate.
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1.3 Theoretical Model
I develop the theoretical model in this section, which bases its ideas in modern endogenous
growth theory, à la Nelson-Phelps (1966). This theory argues that economic growth de-
pends on three specific criteria: (1) the introduction and adoption of new technologies, (2)
the availability and accessibility of the technologies, and (3) the capability of countries to
efficiently use these new resources. These characteristics fit reasonably well during the in-
ternational epidemiological transition, a period of time that started in the 1940s where vast
improvements and innovations in health were made worldwide which were driven in part
by more effective public health measures. New technologies were introduced and made
available worldwide during this time (e.g. the creation of the WHO, the introduction of
new chemicals and vaccines, etc.) and changes in international values (regarding health
practices) made these new ideas and breakthroughs easier to incorporate and integrate into
countries, as well (Acemoglu and Johnson (2007)). Although the accessibility and adop-
tion of these new tools and knowledge is difficult to measure, for simplification purposes,
I assume that all countries could access and assimilate these new resources with ease, as it
diffused worldwide.4
Consider a simplified aggregate production function, where GDP, (Y ), depends on a
technological (or productivity) parameter, (A), the stock of health, (H), and some parame-
ter, (β ):
Y = AHβ (1.1)
4For more in-depth analysis of specific countries, this assumption may not hold. The timing of several
health breakthroughs and disease eradication movements is time dependent, as noted in studies such as Al-
mond (2006), Bleakly (2007), and Beach, Ferrie, Saavedra, and Troesken (2014). Here, I follow Acemoglu
and Johnson (2007) and let the international epidemiological transition’s effects diffuse equally during the
1940s, as they note that most countries worldwide obtained access to most new drugs and chemicals by 1950
and public knowledge of diseases became well-known even earlier. This simplifying assumption will not
change the underlying framework in this paper.
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where 0 < β < 1.
Taking logs of equation (1.1), yields
ln Y = ln A+β ln H
Letting y= ln Y , a= ln A, and h= ln H:
y= a+βh (1.2)
Assume that productivity and technology diffuse according to a simplified Nelson-
Phelps approach, as illustrated by Acemoglu (2009). The governing differential equation
is provided by:
A˙(t) = ψA(t)+φ(h)AF(t) (1.3)
An interpretation of equation (1.3) shows that the evolution of the technology in use,
A(t), depends on a combination of variables: the growth rate of the technology (ψ), the
growth rate of human capital (φ), and the world technological frontier (AF).
Equation (1.3) can also be expressed as:
a˙= ψ(a¯−a)+φh+aF (1.4)
where a˙ = ln A˙ and a¯ = ln A¯. The term A¯ denotes the current world frontier produc-
tivity while the terms ψ,φ , and aF are all constants. Equation (1.4) shows that the major
role of health is to enable workers to effectively cope and adapt with sudden changes and
disruptions in their work (as opposed to their unhealthy counterparts), and allows for faster
adoption of new technologies. In effect, the higher the level of health a country has (the
higher level of h), the more efficient and productive individuals become. As a result, there
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is a direct link between health and productivity; in locations where there is a plethora of
healthy workers, current productivity catches up with the world frontier productivity faster
relative to places where there is less health capital.
Combining equations (1.2) and (1.4), I obtain the following equation:
y˙= ψ(a¯−a)+β h˙+φh+aF (1.5)
Substituting terms and rearranging, equation (1.5) can alternatively be expressed as:
g= y˙= aF +ψ a¯−ψy+β h˙+(φ +βψ)h (1.6)
which now transforms into the growth equation of interest.
Equation (1.6) says that income growth (y˙) should be dependent on three variables; it
should be negatively associated with income per-capita (y) and positively correlated with
both the stock of health (h) and the health growth rate (h˙). This provides a new formulation
into the health and economic growth relationship which, to the best of my knowledge, has
not yet been explored in the literature. This shows that health cannot be measured by only
one component of well-being in my model; there are two distinctive, separate variables
that come into play in the estimations, much like in Krueger and Lindahl (2001), where
education is measured in both stock and accumulation effects. Consequently, this will be
the corresponding equation that will be taken to the data for estimation purposes. Like the
previous literature, I will use life expectancies at birth as the preferred measure of “health”.
Note that if ψ = 0 or β = 0, then economic growth cannot depend on all three variables,
(a,h, h˙) or (y,h, h˙), but rather, just two of them. For this reason, the restrictions of ψ 6= 0
and β 6= 0 are imposed.
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1.4 Empirical Strategy
The empirical methodology and strategy comes directly from the theoretical framework
explained in the previous section. Including potential covariates along with an error term
to equation (1.6) yields:
y˙i,t = aF +ψ a¯i,t−ψyi,t+β h˙i,t+(φ +βψ)hi,t+ ςi+µt+piZ′i,t+ εi,t (1.7)
where the ςis denote a full set of country fixed effects, the µts incorporate time-varying
factors common across all countries, the Z′i,ts denote a vector of other controls, and εi,t
is the error term. The terms i and t denote the individual country and the time period,
respectively.
Like in Acemoglu and Johnson (2007), I estimate equation (1.7) in long differences,
that is, in a panel including only two dates, t and t+1 (in practice, 1900 and 1940 or 1940
and 2000). First differences are then taken to eliminate the time-invariant and country-
specific effects within the model, both of which could present several estimation issues.
In effect, I measure the long differences of the year-over-year changes in both incomes
and life expectancies. These regressions also make interpretation a little easier because
they measure the effect of change in life expectancy growth rates between two dates on the
change in economic variables between the same two dates. Since I only have two dates,
equation (1.7) is algebraically equivalent to estimating the first-differenced specification.
Taking the first differences of equation (1.7), I obtain:
∆(y˙i) = ψ∆a¯i−ψ∆yi+β∆(h˙i)+(φ +βψ)∆hi+∆µ+pi∆Z′i+∆εi (1.8)
where ∆yi ≡ (yi,t+1− yi,t), ∆y˙i ≡ ((yi,n+1− yi,n)− (yi,t+1− yi,t)), and ∆hi and ∆h˙i are
defined similarly. The time subscript t denotes earlier periods in the data set (e.g. 1900
or 1940) while the term n represents the later periods (e.g. 1940 or 2000). Specifically,
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∆yi is the income per capita growth rate, ∆(y˙i) denotes changes in the income per capita
growth rate, ∆hi is the life expectancy growth rate, and ∆(h˙i) measures changes in the life
expectancy growth rate.
OLS estimates of equations (1.7) and (1.8) will not yield the causal effects of health
on economic outcomes because of the presence of time-varying factors simultaneously
affecting both health and economic growth. For example, countries that increased their
relative growth rates in some time period may also have invested more in health during
the same time frame, increasing life expectancies. Generally, countries that have been able
to solve their economic problems are likely to have solved their disease issues, as well.
These considerations imply that life expectancy and life expectancy growth rates are likely
associated with the error term, indicating that both are endogenous to economics. For
this reason, my main focus will be on the IV estimates, exploiting cross-country variation
induced by the international epidemiological transition described in the previous section.
More on the IV strategy and identification is presented later in this section.
This methodology is most similar to approaches used in Krueger and Lindahl (2001),
Weil (2007), Bloom, Canning, and Fink (2013), and Acemoglu and Johnson (2014). The
set-up extends and mimics the estimations laid out in Bloom et al. and Acemoglu and John-
son, but more emphasis is placed on growth rates here rather than variables in level form,
and the focus is on health, rather than education, as in Krueger and Lindahl. Also, unlike
Weil, whose conceptual exercises keep population constant in the estimations, my formu-
lations will look at how a country’s population dynamics change in response to improving
health conditions.
Here, I primarily focus on whether if better health care access and technology acceler-
ates income growth. If countries with improved health do, in fact, grow faster than countries
with worse health, then improving health continues to be an important source of economic
well-being worldwide. Looking at the long differences of the GDP growth rates and life
13
expectancy growth rates provides some important information as to how these variables
evolved over time, rather than just at a single point in time, which many past studies do.
There is also some social benefit to increasing positive differences in both variables, as
it shows improvement in the standard of living. Thus, the relationship and relevance of
these variables is also important to policymakers who can exploit this connection to enact
policies that have the intention of raising future generation’s welfare.
I estimate equation (1.8) over a period of 100 years (1900-2000), breaking the time
frame into two separate, yet distinct periods: (1) periods before the international epidemio-
logical transition (1900-1940) and (2) periods after the transition (1940-2000). In doing so,
I can compare how income growth rates changed in response to the transition as well as the
extent of health’s role in the estimations. This underlies, perhaps, the most important part
of my methodology: it corrects for the omitted-variable bias that is time invariant. Because
the regressions use first differencing to get rid of several potential problems, the estimated
parameters are not correlated with any time-invariant effects that may have occurred during
this time period. Thus, any unobserved time-invariant factors are dropped from the model,
which produces more reliable results.
1.4.1 Data and Summary Statistics
Data primarily comes from Acemoglu and Johnson (2007), which includes relevant infor-
mation about life expectancies, predicted mortality rates, disease mortality rates, population
growth rates, and GDP per capita for the years 1900-2000.5 In order to maximize the num-
ber of countries and observations available, omitted data from Acemoglu and Johnson is
combined with other auxiliary data sources. The Maddison Project (2013) and the World
Bank’s World Development Indicators (2013) is used to supplement GDP data while Gold-
5Please see Acemoglu and Johnson (2007) for an entire list of data sources. A few of the major databases
they utilize include: World Health Organization Epidemiological Reports, National Academy of Sciences,
United Nations Demographic Yearbooks, League of Nations Reports, and the Penn World Tables.
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ewijk, Beusen, and Janssen (2010) augments the population data. Combining these data
sets, I obtain 35 countries in the pre-intervention period, while the number of countries
jumps to 47 in the post-intervention period.6 A list of countries included in the data ap-
pears in the Chapter 1 Appendix. In order to instrument for the life expectancy growth rate
and changes in the life expectancy growth rate, I utilize the data and work of Acemoglu
and Johnson (2007) as well as Lorentzen, McMillan, and Wacziarg (2008), respectively.
A more formal description and discussion of their work and the IV strategy is provided in
Section 1.4.3.
Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1.1 (with standard deviations in parenthe-
ses). Average life expectancy and per-capita GDP levels for 20-year intervals starting in
1900 are shown for the whole world in Panel A, while Panels B and C decomposes them
into developed and developing countries, respectively. Looking at the entire world, we see
that substantial gains have been made in both health and wealth since the 1900s, with life
expectancies at birth increasing by about 25 years and overall per-capita incomes rising by
more than $4,200. Breaking down these gains by countries, however, shows a stark dif-
ference between the two. Overall, developed countries have seen more gains in incomes
($17,693 vs. $3,203) while the developing countries see the same trend in life expectancies
(40.18 years vs. 28.35 years). In the pre-intervention period, though, developed coun-
tries see much larger gains in both life expectancies (15.78 years vs. 12.62 years) and
incomes ($2,137 vs. $162) than the developing countries. After the epidemiological tran-
sition, though, health gains slowed down in richer countries compared to poorer countries
(12.57 years vs. 27.55 years), but the income gap between the two only seemed to get
larger ($15,550 vs $3,041). These statistics paint a picture that show that the overall health
and wealth of countries worldwide appear to be positively associated with one another, al-
6Like in Acemoglu and Johnson (2007), countries from Africa are excluded due to concerns about
HIV/AIDS, and how the presence of the disease would impact the results. Many Eastern European coun-
tries are also left out due to the questionable reliability of the data.
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though the true nature of the relationship and its scope needs to be tested formally. Another
interesting thing to note is that there appears to be convergence in total life expectancy
rates between developing and developed countries, but there is minimal evidence in terms
of GDP per capita, which could explain a component of the scope of income inequality that
has become so prevalent in the world today.
1.4.2 OLS Estimates
Table 1.2 presents the OLS results which estimates the parameters of equation (1.8). Columns
(1)-(4) measure the pre-intervention period growth rates (1900-1940) while columns (5)-
(8) measure the post-intervention period growth rates (1940-2000). In column (1), I run a
regression using only the log life expectancy growth rate as a regressor to the changes in the
log GDP growth rate. The negative and statistically significant result mimics Acemoglu and
Johnson’s (2007) findings, although the magnitude here is slightly larger. In column (2), the
primary predictor is the long difference in the log life expectancy growth rate, and it shows
a positive and significant relationship with income growth changes, which is in contrast to
the previous finding. Both variables are combined into a single regression in column (3),
where a few noteworthy things are made apparent. First, both the life expectancy growth
rate and changes in the life expectancy growth rate exhibit a significant, positive associa-
tion with changes in the GDP growth rate. Second, the magnitude of correlation between
life expectancy growth rates and income changes overwhelms the results obtained when
following a simplified approach as in column (1). In fact, this combined approach corrects
for omitted-variable biases in both “pure” regression types as witnessed by the increase
in explained variance when regressing over both variables. Column (4) includes the GDP
per capita growth rate as a control, and the results quantitatively and qualitatively remain
the same. The results suggest that a one-percent increase in the life expectancy growth
rate should lead to a 0.8111 percent increase in changes of the income growth rate. Over
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a span of 40 years, this roughly translates to an average 0.0203 percentage point increase
in incomes per year. Increasing the long differences of the life expectancy growth rate
by one percent exhibits an even stronger effect, correlating to an average 0.0566 percent
increase in incomes per year over the same time span. Columns (5)-(8) repeat the same
exercise but for the post-intervention years. The results are similar, but appear to be larger
in magnitude, suggesting that the health increases caused by the international epidemio-
logical transition may have brought about some potent and significant changes in income
growth rates worldwide. Lastly, columns (4) and (8) also confirm the theoretical framework
provided in Section 1.3, suggesting that both measures of health are important in determin-
ing changes in the income growth rate and should be included together in the regression
estimates.
1.4.3 Instrumentation Strategy
In order to address concerns about endogeneity, both life expectancy growth rates and
changes in life expectancy growth rates must be instrumented. Since two endogenous vari-
ables are present, at least two reliable instruments are required in the estimations. There
are a few studies that have previously tried to instrument for health and life expectancies7,
but care must be taken to incorporate instruments that not only cover the same time periods
that I look at, but also provide an appropriate first-stage fit. In this section, I detail how
I instrument both endogenous variables and provide a brief explanation as to why these
instruments are applicable in this setting. The IV estimation and results are provided at the
end of the section along with one possible mechanism that can explain the progression of
the outcomes.
7See Young (2005), Weil (2007), and Hansen (2013) for further details.
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1.4.4 Instrumenting Life Expectancy Growth Rates
To proxy the life expectancy growth rate, I utilize the predicted mortality instrument con-
structed by Acemoglu and Johnson (2007). The authors exploit the wave of health inno-
vations that occurred in the 1940s and affected all countries worldwide using predicted
mortality as a natural experiment for the growth in life expectancy. More precisely, they
use the pre-intervention distribution of mortality from 15 diseases8 and the dates of global
intervention to construct a country-varying instrument for life expectancy. The construction
of the predicted mortality instrument is given by the following equation:
MIit = ∑
d∈D
[(1− Idt)Mdi+ IdtMdFt ] (1.9)
where Mdit denotes the mortality from disease d in country i at time t, Idt is a dummy
variable for intervention for disease d at time t (which is equal to 1 for all dates after the
intervention), D is the set of all diseases available in the data set, and MdFt is the mortality
rate from disease d at the health frontier of the world at time t. Equation (1.9) shows
that the only source of variation in predicted mortality comes from the interaction of the
baseline distribution of diseases with the dates of global interventions. Since variations in
mortality are unrelated to any actions or economic events in the country, there is no obvious
reason for it to be correlated with economic or population shocks in the country in question.
Thus, Acemoglu and Johnson’s instrument remains valid under my particular case and is
used as an instrument for life expectancy growth rates in the estimation of equation (1.8).
A deeper discussion about the formation of this IV, which is subjugated to a battery of
robustness checks and tests, is provided in their paper. Unlike Bloom, Canning, and Fink
(2013), who find the instrument untenable, I find no major reasons to attack the IV strategy
or its assumptions. For the purposes of this study, I accept that Acemoglu and Johnson’s
8Diseases include tuberculosis, malaria, pneumonia, influenza, cholera, typhoid, smallpox, whooping
cough, measles, diphtheria, scarlet fever, yellow fever, plague, typhus fever, and dysentery.
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suppositions about the instrument are valid and its formulation provides an appropriate
first-stage fit for the life expectancy growth rate.
1.4.5 Instrumenting Changes in the Life Expectancy Growth Rate
To instrument changes in the life expectancy growth rate, I utilize the work of Lorentzen,
McMillan, and Wacziarg (2008). The authors formulate a structural model in which they
explore the casual link between economic growth and mortality rates over the 20th century.
Explicitly relating the adult mortality rate to a set of exogenous instrumental variables,
their work further shows how changes in the morality rate affect incomes worldwide over
the same time period. Although I use life expectancies as my measure of health instead of
mortality rates, the two variables are closely connected with one another and have been used
interchangeably in past literature, usually as robustness checks for one another.9 Lorentzen
et al.’s work also provides a good complement to Acemoglu and Johnson’s, as it covers
the same time frame and includes a measure of disease prevalence and incidence that is
calculated in a similar manner.
In their paper, Lorentzen et al. identify three particular categories to build their in-
strument: the geographic features of a country, the climatic aspects of a country, and the
Malaria Ecology Index, originally developed by Sachs et al. (2004). In all, the authors
utilize 18 different variables in their estimations: 5 geographic variables10, 12 climatic
9See Hansen (2013) for a list of studies that utilize the variables in both manners.
10To quantify the geographic features of a country, Lorentzen et al. use the following variables: distance
of a country’s center from the equator, mean distance to the nearest coastline, average elevation, typical
population density, and the log of land area.
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variables11, and the Malaria Ecology Index12. Several instruments are utilized in this case
in order to create a better first-stage fit of changes in life expectancy growth rates. Each
category of instrumental variable provides an important link to life expectancy changes all
the while having no correlation with a country’s economic activity. Measures of a coun-
try’s geographic factors are included because they are related to the climatic and historical
factors affecting mortality and life expectancy levels within countries. Climatic variables
provide a deep look at how diseases are distributed worldwide, as certain diseases need spe-
cific ranges of temperature, precipitation, and humidity to survive and spread. Finally, the
Malaria Ecology Index supplements these categories, linking malaria incidence and other
tropical diseases to our measure of health. Like in the previous case, a deeper discussion
about these variables and its robustness is provided in the original paper. The best fit found
by the authors includes all three groups of variables, rather than some combination of each.
Thus, I will use all three categories in my estimations, as well.13 The amalgamation of these
variables are valid instruments under the assumption that they affect economic growth only
through the endogenous regressors. Since none of these variables are affected by human
activity and are independent of economic growth, this assumption is reasonably met, which
make them practical and plausible instruments for changes in the life expectancy growth
rate in equation (1.8). Using more instruments can create a better overview of how liv-
ing conditions evolved over time, which could also lead to a better first-stage regression
11To quantify the climatic features of a country, Lorentzen et al. use the Köppen-Geiger climate zones,
which breaks the world into 12 distinctive climate areas: tropical rainforest climate (Af), tropical monsoon
climate (Am), tropical savanna climate with dry winters (Aw), steppe/semi-arid climate (Bs), desert climate
(Bw), warm temperate and fully humid climate (Cf), warm temperate climate with dry summers (Cs), warm
temperate climate with dry winters (Cw), snowy and fully humid climate (Df), snowy climate with dry sum-
mers (Ds), snowy climate with dry winters (Dw), and tundra/frost climate (E). I eliminate Category E from
the estimations to avoid complete linear dependence in the model.
12The Malaria Ecology Index corrects for potential endogeneity issues stemming from human activity and
actions. From Sachs et al. (2004), the index “combines climatic factors, the presence of different mosquito
vector types and the human biting rate of the different mosquito vectors” to generate measures of potential
malaria prevalence that can be applied to any time period.
13I proceed in the same manner as Lorentzen et al., testing each category separately, then in combinations
with one another. Like them, I find that estimation using all three categories provides the best first-stage fit.
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fit. Furthermore, under these specifications, tests of over-identifying restrictions can be
performed to indicate the validity and strength of the instruments.
1.4.6 First-Stage Results
How well the instruments fit the endogenous regressors is provided in Table 1.3. The top
half of the table presents the estimated coefficients in the first-stage regressions while the
bottom half provides statistical test results regarding the strength of the instruments. Both
are enough to determine the validity and suitability of the instruments utilized. To avoid
any confusion about the instruments, I differentiate Acemoglu and Johnson’s instrument as
“Predicted Mortality” and Lorentzen, McMillan, and Wacziarg’s collection of instruments
as “Health Environment”. The signs and magnitude on all of the coefficients appear to
be appropriate and shows sufficient statistical significance, which suggests an apposite fit
for both instrumental variables. A more important concern lies in the strength of the in-
struments, where weak instruments bias the IV estimates towards OLS (Staiger and Stock
(1997)). The bottom of Table 1.3 presents the F-statistics and Shea’s R2 figures from each
first-stage regression. The relationships are generally quite strong, with the statistical tests
substantiating the validity of both instruments.14 Finally, the Sargan-Hansen test of over-
identifying restrictions show that the instruments are not incorrectly misspecified within
the model and that the error terms are uncorrelated with the instruments themselves. This
result is also robust in the presence of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. All of these
results validate the use of both sets of instruments in the estimations and corroborate both
Acemoglu and Johnson’s and Lorentzen et al.’s work.
14According to Staiger and Stock (1997), the general rule of thumb for accessing the weakness of instru-
ments states that instruments are weak when the first-stage F-test takes a value that is less than 10. However,
this rule generally applies when there is only one endogenous regressor. Since I have more than one endoge-
nous predictor, I mostly rely on the Shea’s R2 value as a measure of first-stage fit. Although there is no rule of
thumb as to what constitutes a “high enough” Shea’s R2, the results here do not strike me as being a particular
cause for concern, as most of the statistical tests point in the same direction and offer the same conclusion.
21
1.4.7 IV Estimates
Table 1.4 presents the IV estimation and results, and the setup follows the same structure as
Table 1.2. The second-stage results of the regression confirm the theoretical framework that
both life expectancy growth rates and changes in the life expectancy growth rate are posi-
tively related to changes in the income per capita growth rate while GDP per capita growth
rates are negatively associated with them. Periods after the international epidemiological
transition appear to have a stronger association to growth, insinuating the important role
improving health may have had on increasing incomes worldwide. Compared to previous
literature, I confirm the results of both Weil (2007) and Lorentzen, McMillan, and Wacziarg
(2008) that the casual effects of health on growth are positive and significant, although the
magnitudes here are moderately smaller in size. For the post-intervention period, a one
percent increase in the life expectancy growth rate leads to a 0.7940 percent increase in
changes of the income growth rate. Over a span of 60 years, this translates to an average
0.0132 percentage point increase in incomes per year. Similarly, a one percent increase in
the long differences of the life expectancy growth rate corresponds to an average 0.0397
percent increase in incomes per year over the same time period. Thus, the health increases
made during this period seems to have positively impacted income growth rate changes,
reinforcing the health and wealth relationship.
In order to show what particular mechanism could cause this relationship, I repeat the
same estimation regression again instead using changes in the population growth rate as
the outcome variable. Tables 1.5, 1.6, and 1.7 report the OLS, first-stage, and second-stage
estimates and results. Once again, the structure of the tables follows that of the preceding
tables presented in the previous sections. How the population dynamics evolve over time
can provide one possible avenue as to why health improvements led to increases in the
GDP per capita growth rate worldwide. Consistent with the estimates presented thus far,
both the life expectancy growth rate and changes in the life expectancy growth rate have
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positive and statistically significant effects on the long differences of the population growth
rate. The results show that a one percent increase in the life expectancy growth rate leads to
a 0.3251 percentage point increase in the change of population growth rates over a period of
60 years–much smaller than the results found in Young (2005) and Acemoglu and Johnson
(2007). Looking at the long differences of the life expectancy growth rates provides a
similar outcome. Thus, unlike these studies, I find that increases in the life expectancy
growth rate leads to larger changes in the income growth rate than in the population growth
rate, which can partially account for the growth in incomes per capita worldwide.
1.5 Conclusion
Although the connection between health and long-run economic growth has been discussed
extensively in the literature, there is still no clear-cut conclusion if a causal relationship be-
tween the two variables exist. By developing a simplified theoretical framework based in
modern endogenous growth theory, I decompose the relationship between the two, finding
that health does indeed play a significant role in raising income per-capita growth rates
worldwide in periods before and after the international epidemiological transition. The
effects appear to be stronger in the post-intervention period, suggesting that the large in-
creases in health could have directly influenced the rapid rise of incomes over the past 60
years. Although there are several mechanisms and channels that remain to be tested, the
results here suggest that incomes worldwide have grown faster than the population, which
has led to the higher per-capita incomes seen today.
It is important to note that while the results may pervade on a macroeconomic level,
further research needs to be completed on a microeconomic level. Several avenues, as
shown in the literature review section, such as productivity and savings behavior remain
viable topics to pursue in the health and economic growth literature. Exploring health’s
impact on education outcomes could also prove to be a worthwhile venture, as both topics
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are closely related to one another. Some further variation may also be strained out by
including Eastern European and African countries into the data set. Along these same
lines, further analysis of other diseases may provide deeper scope and consideration into the
literature. Many of the diseases looked at in this study have been eradicated (e.g. smallpox
and measles) while others that were major killers in the past are not as deadly today (e.g.
pneumonia and influenza). Including these omitted countries and newer diseases such as
Ebola, rotavirus, and HIV/AIDS would certainly create greater variation in the model and
give a more modern view of the relationship between health and economic growth around
the world.
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1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000
Life Expectancy at Birth
39.23
(9.57)
49.11
(11.05)
49.68
 (11.85)
51.60
(12.50)
59.56 
(11.29)
64.46
(11.67)
GDP per Capita
2032.28
(1158.87)
2752.25
(1743.26)
2690.03
(1804.40)
3079.09
(4367.11)
5006.72
(5265.54)
6247.49
(7063.67)
1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000
Life Expectancy at Birth
49.36
(3.67)
58.70
(3.94)
65.14
(1.86)
71.20
(1.25)
74.31
(1.13)
77.71
(1.16)
GDP per Capita
3577.88
(637.50)
4329.83
(1079.25)
5715.14
(860.97)
9080.22
(1557.56)
15152.07
(2026.91)
21271.08
(2996.59)
1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000
Life Expectancy at Birth
28.00
(5.16)
30.22
(10.20)
40.63
(8.39)
52.20
(9.42)
61.93
(7.19)
68.18
(5.64)
GDP per Capita
927.76
(366.70)
799.09
(232.03)
1090.33
(332.54)
1692.07
(1228.76)
3015.98
(2553.54)
4131.43
(3645.77)
Panel (A): Whole World
Panel (C): Developing Countries
Panel (B): Developed Countries
Table 1.1: Descriptive Statistics
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Log Life Expectancy Growth Rate
-0.9426***
(0.3505)
0.6915**
(0.2811)
0.8111***
(0.2578)
-1.6329**
(0.7305)
0.8327**
(0.3331)
0.9811***
(0.2673)
Δ Log Life Expectancy Growth Rate
1.7218**
(0.6889)
1.7995**
(0.6393)
2.2650***
(0.5490)
1.8213**
(0.7284)
1.8240**
(0.7537)
2.6364***
(0.8787)
Log  GDP per Capita Growth Rate
-0.9017**
(0.3844)
-0.9532*
(0.4888)
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 70 70 70 70 94 94 94 94
Number of Countries 35 35 35 35 47 47 47 47
R
2
0.0817 0.1772 0.2265 0.3819 0.1152 0.1937 0.2744 0.3218
Notes: This table reports the OLS estimates. The pre-intervention periods measure growth over the years 1900-1940 and is denoted in columns (1)-(4). 
The post-intervention periods measure growth over the years 1940-2000 and is denoted in columns (5)-(8). Robust standard errors are provided in
parentheses. Significance is defined as: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
1900-1940 1940-2000
Dependent Variable: Change in Log GDP per Capita Growth Rates
Table 1.2: OLS Estimates--Impact of Life Expectancy Growth Rates on Chanes in GDP per Capita Growth Rates
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Predicted Mortality (AJ)
-1.2176***
(0.3888)
0.3418**
(0.1182)
0.2814***
(0.0901)
-1.6916*
(0.4846)
0.4075***
(0.1345)
0.3698***
(0.1339)
Health Environment (LMW)
Climate
0.1824*
(0.1006)
0.8511*
(0.4693)
0.9223**
(0.3928)
0.3918*
(0.2123)
0.8724*
(0.4884)
1.1470**
(0.4898)
Geography
0.0328
(0.0212)
0.4618*
(0.2720)
0.5217*
(0.2973)
0.0816
(0.0651)
0.5113*
(.3021)
0.6127*
(0.3452)
Malaria Ecology Index
1.2713
(0.8640)
0.8311*
(0.4894)
0.7245*
(0.3977)
0.9420
(0.6461)
0.7471
(0.5515)
0.6435*
(0.3551)
Log GDP per Capita Growth Rate
-0.3462*
(0.1962)
-0.4906*
(0.2679)
Predicted Mortality (AJ)
-0.2671*
(0.1508)
0.6199*
(0.3413)
0.4564**
(0.2292)
-0.3754*
(0.2108)
0.7281*
(0.3947)
0.5819**
(0.2479)
Health Environment (LMW)
Table 1.3: 2SLS IV Estimates--First-Stage Regression Estimations of Life Expectancy Growth Rates (Income Dynamics)
Dependent Variable: Log Life Expectancy Growth Rate
Dependent Variable: Δ Log Life Expectancy Growth Rate
1900-1940 1940-2000
First-Stage Results
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Climate
1.8132**
(0.7798)
1.6376**
(0.6542)
1.2155**
(0.4535)
1.9284**
(0.9064)
1.7611**
(0.7213)
1.5737**
(0.5954)
Geography
0.1204*
(0.0712)
0.3618*
(0.2170)
0.4182*
(0.2267)
0.2812*
(0.1542)
0.4018*
(0.2206)
0.4189*
(0.2203)
Malaria Ecology Index
1.0039*
(0.5537)
0.8419*
(0.5028)
0.8622*
(0.5066)
0.9127*
(0.4832)
0.8196*
(0.4786)
0.8813*
(0.5114)
Log GDP per Capita Growth Rate 
-0.2481*
(0.1448)
-0.3018*
(0.1635)
Shea's R
2 
(Log Life Expectancy Growth Rate)
0.3938 0.3712 0.2745 0.3281 0.2918 0.2519
Shea's R
2 
(Δ Log Life Expectancy Growth Rate)
0.2185 0.1916 0.1679 0.3184 0.2713 0.2234
First-Stage F Statistics 
(Log Life Expectancy Growth Rate)
38.91 27.46 19.23 39.15 30.04 21.86
First-Stage F Statistics 
(Δ  Log Life Expectancy Growth Rate)
21.46 18.17 15.20 22.97 17.33 16.40
Sargan-Hansen J-Statistic p-Value 0.2687 0.2434 0.2843 0.2813 0.2248 0.2761
Set of Instruments AJ LMW AJ+LMW AJ+LMW AJ LMW AJ+LMW AJ+LMW
Notes: This table reports the first-stage IV estimates. The pre-intervention periods measure growth over the years 1900-1940 and is denoted in columns (1)-(4). The
post-intervention periods measure growth over the years 1940-2000 and is denoted in columns (5)-(8). Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses. AJ
indicates the predicted mortality instrument used in Acemoglu and Johnson (2007). LMW indicates the set of instruments used in Lorentzen, McMillan, and Wacziarg
(2008). Significance is defined as: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Log Life Expectancy Growth Rate
-0.8123*
(0.4403)
0.6412**
(0.3190)
0.6374**
(0.2994)
-1.4849*
(0.8514)
0.7472**
(0.3575)
0.7940**
(0.3373)
Δ  Log Life Expectancy Growth Rate
1.2642*
(0.7198)
1.6935**
(0.8492)
1.7103**
(0.6880)
1.3774*
(0.7392)
1.6823**
(0.7842)
2.3796**
(0.9663)
Log GDP per Capita Growth Rate
-0.8127*
(0.4722)
-0.8518*
(0.4940)
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 70 70 70 70 94 94 94 94
Number of Countries 35 35 35 35 47 47 47 47
R
2 0.0415 0.1127 0.1984 0.3261 0.0821 0.1588 0.2267 0.3002
Set of Instruments AJ LMW AJ+LMW AJ+LMW AJ LMW AJ+LMW AJ+LMW
Notes: This table reports the second-stage IV estimates. The pre-intervention periods measure growth over the years 1900-1940 and is denoted in columns 
(1)-(4). The post-intervention periods measure growth over the years 1940-2000 and is denoted in columns (5)-(8). Robust standard errors are provided in
parentheses.  AJ indicates the predicted mortality instrument used in Acemoglu and Johnson (2007). LMW indicates the set of instruments used in 
Lorentzen, McMillan, and Wacizarg (2008). Significance is defined as: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 1.4: 2SLS IV Estimates--Impact of Life Expectancy Growth Rates on Changes in GDP per Capita Growth Rates
1900-1940 1940-2000
Dependent Variable: Change in Log GDP per Capita Growth Rates
Second-Stage Results
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Log Life Expectancy Growth Rate
0.1182**
(0.0550)
0.0931**
(0.0415)
0.2244**
(0.0970)
0.1512**
(0.0627)
0.3138**
(0.1478)
0.2536**
(0.0989)
Δ  Log Life Expectancy Growth Rate
0.5232**
(0.2453)
0.1250**
(0.0536)
0.3860*
(0.1978)
0.5430**
(0.2418)
0.1760**
(0.0823)
0.2880*
(0.1588)
Log Population Growth Rate
-1.9412*
(1.0252)
-1.4618*
(0.7933)
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 70 70 70 70 94 94 94 94
Number of Countries 35 35 35 35 47 47 47 47
R
2 0.0552 0.0622 0.1345 0.1860 0.0703 0.0915 0.1840 0.2283
Notes: This table reports the OLS estimates. The pre-intervention periods measure growth over the years 1900-1940 and is denoted in columns (1)-(4). 
The post-intervention periods measure growth over the years 1940-2000 and is denoted in columns (5)-(8). Robust standard errors are provided in
parentheses. Significance is defined as: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
1900-1940 1940-2000
Dependent Variable: Change in Log Population Growth Rates
Table 1.5: OLS Estimates--Impact of Life Expectancy Growth Rates on Changes in Population Growth Rates
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Predicted Mortality (AJ)
-0.1718***
(0.0493)
0.0983**
(0.0423)
0.1836**
(0.0830)
-0.1620***
(0.0496)
0.1384**
(0.0620)
0.1934**
(0.0829)
Health Environment (LMW)
Climate
0.4136**
(0.1939)
0.1855**
(0.0929)
0.2518**
(0.1192)
0.4811**
(0.2386)
0.1976**
(0.0835)
0.2716**
(0.1148)
Geography
0.0615
(0.0551)
0.1276*
(0.0677)
0.2018*
(0.1088)
0.1204
(0.0975)
0.3650*
(0.1977)
0.4167*
(0.2393)
Malaria Ecology Index
2.4112
(1.838)
1.7453*
(1.055)
1.4433*
(0.8281)
2.7362
(2.0801)
1.9849*
(1.165)
1.8024*
(1.0467)
Log Population Growth Rate
0.3458*
(0.1961)
0.2618*
(0.1545)
Predicted Mortality (AJ)
-0.2188*
(0.1096)
0.3412*
(0.1748)
0.2115**
(0.0911)
-0.2417*
(0.1257)
0.1688*
(0.0879)
0.2316**
(0.0998)
Health Environment (LMW)
Table 1.6: 2SLS IV Estimates--First-Stage Regression Estimations of Life Expectancy Growth Rates (Population Dynamics)
Dependent Variable: Log Life Expectancy Growth Rate
Dependent Variable: Δ Log Life Expectancy Growth Rate
1900-1940 1940-2000
First-Stage Results
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Climate
0.6214**
(0.2418)
0.3189**
(0.1320)
0.4619**
(0.2173)
0.5136**
(0.2130)
0.2413**
(0.1135)
0.4186**
(0.1951)
Geography
0.1893
(0.1228)
0.2841
(0.1994)
0.3356*
(0.2020)
0.3926
(0.2804)
0.4682*
(0.2738)
0.5203*
(0.2873)
Malaria Ecology Index
1.2471
(0.9508)
1.0235*
(0.6202)
0.9975*
(0.5833)
1.3776
(1.0007)
1.2993*
(0.7480)
1.1450*
(0.6326)
Log Population Growth Rate
0.5174*
(0.2779)
0.6271*
(0.3314)
Shea's R
2 
(Log Life Expectancy Growth Rate)
0.2940 0.2618 0.2245 0.2813 0.2518 0.2003
Shea's R
2 
(Δ Log Life Expectancy Growth Rate)
0.1922 0.1745 0.1698 0.2186 0.1963 0.1759
First-Stage F Statistics 
(Log Life Expectancy Growth Rate)
21.46 19.89 15.26 18.37 17.34 15.03
First-Stage F Statistics 
(Δ  Log Life Expectancy Growth Rate)
17.45 16.36 14.18 16.96 15.12 13.36
Sargan-Hansen J-Test Statistic p-Value 0.2512 0.2361 0.1985 0.2364 0.2015 0.1854
Set of Instruments AJ LMW AJ+LMW AJ+LMW AJ LMW AJ+LMW AJ+LMW
Notes: This table reports the first-stage IV estimates. The pre-intervention periods measure growth over the years 1900-1940 and is denoted in columns (1)-(4). The
post-intervention periods measure growth over the years 1940-2000 and is denoted in columns (5)-(8). Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses. AJ
indicates the predicted mortality instrument used in Acemoglu and Johnson (2007). LMW indicates the set of instruments used in  Lorentzen, McMillan, and Wacziarg
(2008). Significance is defined as: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Log Life Expectancy Growth Rate
0.1936**
(0.0912)
0.1524**
(0.0620)
0.2726**
(0.1158)
0.1864**
(0.0792)
0.3817**
(0.1582)
0.3251**
(0.1347)
Δ  Log Life Expectancy Growth Rate
0.6217**
(0.2674)
0.3418*
(0.1871)
0.4415*
(0.2329)
0.6184**
(0.2565)
0.2105*
(0.1179)
0.3015*
(0.1593)
Log Population Growth Rate
-2.1743*
(1.2339)
-1.8468*
(1.0167)
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 70 70 70 70 94 94 94 94
Number of Countries 35 35 35 35 47 47 47 47
R
2 0.0215 0.0847 0.1623 0.2015 0.0315 0.0617 0.1526 0.1924
Set of Instruments AJ LMW AJ+LMW AJ+LMW AJ LMW AJ+LMW AJ+LMW
Notes: This table reports the second-stage IV estimates. The pre-intervention periods measure growth over the years 1900-1940 and is denoted in columns 
(1)-(4). The post-intervention periods measure growth over the years 1940-2000 and is denoted in columns (5)-(8). Robust standard errors are provided in
parentheses.  AJ indicates the predicted mortality instrument used in Acemoglu and Johnson (2007). LMW indicates the set of instruments used in 
Lorentzen, McMillan, and Wacizarg (2008). Significance is defined as: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 1.7: 2SLS IV Estimates--Impact of Life Expectancy Growth Rates on Changes in Population Growth Rates
1900-1940 1940-2000
Dependent Variable: Change in Log Population Growth Rates
Second-Stage Results
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CHAPTER 2
THE EFFECT OF HEALTH ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: THEORY AND
EVIDENCE FROM SUB-SAHARAN AFRICAN HOUSEHOLDS
2 Introduction
2.1 Motivation
How do exogenous shocks in longevity influence individual’s optimal fertility, labor sup-
ply, and education decisions? The effects of improving health on economic growth has
an extensive and robust literature yet there lies little consensus on both the theoretical and
empirical fronts. The relationship has been especially tough to decompose due to several
econometric issues such as lack of data, measurement error, differing model specifications,
and endogeneity. Instead of focusing on the direct relationship between health and eco-
nomic growth, more research has now shifted to the potential mechanisms that are affected
by changing health. Channels such as savings, education, physical capital accumulation,
productivity, the demographic transition, fertility, population, labor supply, and others have
been explored in some fashion by past literature and find varying results. By studying
these mechanisms, researchers can observe the indirect effect of health on growth, which
can provide a more enlightening and informative explanation of the relationship between
the variables. Digging deeper into decomposing these effects provides substantial policy
implications, which can lead to faster and sustainable economic development in countries
worldwide.
Two main theoretical thoughts exist in this literature, both of which rely on modeling
human behavior and individual’s responses to exogenous shocks. The first of these theories
is the standard neoclassical model as illustrated in Schultz (1990). In this model, improving
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health and life expectancy has certain limits and drawbacks. Although productivity may
initially improve with gains in health, the growth is not sustainable due to the population
growth that occurs along with better health. Larger populations lead to reductions in both
capital-labor and land-labor ratios and may reduce productivity as the workplace becomes
more crowded. Holding all else constant, per-capita incomes fall. If the benefits of a higher
life expectancy are limited and if some factors of production are supplied inelastically,
then incomes could fall even further. In contrast, the endogenous growth model in the
tradition of Becker and Barro (1988) showcases that improvements in health may induce
fertility, labor, and human capital responses which may counteract the ideas set forth in
the neoclassical model. For example, according to Baier, Dwyer Jr., and Tamura (2006)
and Tamura (2006), when faced with longer life expectancies, individuals are incentivized
to increase their savings, work more, or make larger investments in their own education.
Similarly, there may be a quantity-quality trade-off in children à la Galor and Weil (1999)
where parents have fewer children and invest more in the quality of their children (usually
through education). All of these behavioral adjustments in response to improving health
lead to higher incomes and economic growth which may or may not offset the reductions in
economic growth caused by declining productivity and decreasing capital/land-labor ratios
as shown in the neoclassical model. Thus, the theoretical predictions of health’s net effect
on economic growth remains mixed in the literature.
Additionally, empirical findings on the topic have been quite varied. Past studies by
Gallup, Sachs, and Mellinger (1999), Bloom, Canning, and Sevilla (2004), and Lorentzen,
McMillan, and Wacziarg (2008) provide evidence for large, positive gains in incomes that
are to be expected from improvements in health, ranging through a variety of mechanisms,
including the ones listed above. However, calibrations and further extensions to these works
by Weil (2007) and Ashraf, Lester, and Weil (2009) suggest that the effect of health on
growth is minimal. Recently, papers have begun to find that there is no association between
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health and per-capita income growth, most notably from Acemoglu and Johnson (2007)
and Cervellati and Sunde (2011), who show that the improvements in health brought about
by the international epidemiological transition have actually led to decreases in per-capita
incomes worldwide. Once again, all of these contrasting results suggest that the relation-
ship between health and economic development is rather complex and requires a deeper
analysis of the channels and mechanisms in order to fully decompose the effects.
In order to reconcile these differences, I proceed in two steps. First, I develop a theoret-
ical model that links health with three important economic behavioral variables: fertility,
labor supply, and education. The setup used in my model most closely follows the over-
lapping generations (OLG) framework set up in Zhang and Zhang (2005) and Boucekkine,
Desbordes, and Latzer (2009). While the former includes education and fertility in the
utility function, and the latter incorporates fertility and labor supply, my model fully in-
tegrates all three variables. I begin under a partial equilibrium setting, where wages and
the interest rate are fixed, which allows me to characterize optimal decisions in the face
of unknown adult survival probabilities. In this situation, I find that decreases in survival
probability lead to increases in fertility while decreasing both labor supply and education,
mainly through substitution and income effects. I then move on to study how optimal fer-
tility, labor supply, and education decisions change when wages and the interest rate move
exogenously. This second stage can be seen as an intermediary step, where the final goal
is towards general equilibrium, where wages and the interest rate are endogenous within
the model. The results here are dependent on certain parametric conditions (i.e. the in-
tertemporal elasticity of substitution (σ)). When the elasticity is small enough (σ < 1), I
find that increases in the wage (or interest rate) lead to decreases in fertility and increases
in both labor supply and education. Once again, substitution and income effects are key in
measuring the magnitude of the changes. Finally, I move on towards general equilibrium,
where wages and the interest rate are now endogenously determined. In this case, I show
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that decreases in survival probability causes wages to unambiguously increase, which then
leads to ambiguous effects on fertility, labor supply, and education.
In the second step, I complement the theoretical model with an empirical analysis,
adding to the health and economic growth debate. I give particular focus to Sub-Saharan
African (SSA) countries, which fits the theoretical model better than other areas of the
world, as this area has been more susceptible to certain diseases like malaria and HIV/AIDS.
Past research has typically relied on country-level data, with gross domestic product (GDP)
as the explanatory variable of interest due to lack of reliable records and endogeneity con-
cerns. I stray away from this convention and instead follow the approaches of Soares
(2006) and Jayachandran and Lleras-Muney (2009), who use micro-level data. Valuable
information and variation can be strained from household and survey data, which can pro-
vide revealing details that are not readily apparent in macro-level data (e.g. income effect,
substitution effect, precautionary demand, etc.). Using 113 surveys compiled by the De-
mographic and Health Surveys (DHS) in 36 Sub-Saharan African countries taken from
the years 1986-2014, I create my own panel data set to test the implications of improv-
ing health on fertility, labor supply, and human capital investment. I then proceed with
regression analysis first using ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation then system-GMM
estimation as an econometric instrument. I find that fertility is negatively related to life
expectancy, and that there is no difference in the outcomes between high-HIV countries
and low-HIV countries. I also determine that labor force participation is positively related
to improving health both in males and females, although the overall effect is weak. Finally,
I find that life expectancy and education are positively related, having a greater influence
in low-HIV countries than in high-HIV countries. Overall, the results from this new data
set imply that improving health in SSA countries will induce positive gains in economic
growth through the mechanisms of fertility, labor supply, and education.
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The outline for the rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2.2 provides a brief literature
review which links my work with the previous literature. Section 2.3 develops the theoret-
ical framework of the model and presents its predictions about optimal behavior in both a
partial equilibrium setting and in a general equilibrium framework. The empirical exercise
begins in Section 2.4, where a description of the data and the calculation and of variables is
outlined. The empirical strategy then follows with a presentation of the empirical method-
ology and estimation which includes an analysis of the results obtained. Finally, Section
2.5 concludes.
2.2 Literature Review
This paper closely relates and contributes to the existing literature that has studied the links
between mortality and important economic development variables such as fertility, labor,
and education. Examining the literature concerned with health’s impact on fertility, most
papers branch off into two separate categories looking at either increasing infant mortal-
ity (Sah (1991), Boldrin and Jones (2002), Kalemli-Ozcan (2002), Doepke (2005), Galor
(2005)) or decreasing survival probability (Zhang and Zhang (2005), Hazan and Zoabi
(2006)). These papers give rise to the ideas of the “hoarding effect” and precautionary
demand for children. These ideas suggest that as life spans change, household preferences
also change, inducing a quantity-quality tradeoff in children. Here, my model bears a
closer relationship with the latter, as I look at exogenous shocks that affect adult survival
rates.15 My framework also bears a similarity to the literature disseminating health’s im-
pacts on education, which also breaks down measures of health into either increasing mor-
tality (Krueger and Lindahl (2001), Jayachandran and Lleras-Muney (2009)) or decreasing
life expectancies (Soares (2006)). More recent explorations in this realm, though, tend to
15There are also papers that combine both of these effects within a single framework. Models developed
by Galor and Weil (1999), Soares (2005), and Cervellati and Sunde (2007) all share this feature.
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look at specific diseases and their influences on education, most notably with hookworms
in Bleakley (2007) and Huntington’s Disease in Oster, Shoulson, and Dorsey (2013). Using
the same motivation as these authors, I explore the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Africa and scru-
tinize the potential impacts it has on education. Finally, this study also relates to papers that
examine health’s impacts on labor supply. The studies here typically find ambiguous results
due to the contradicting nature of substitution and income effects. Bloom, Canning, and
Sevilla (2004) note that while improving health does improve the productivity of workers,
the amount of labor in the markets may remain unchanged. Cervellati and Sunde (2013)
also find a similar effect, with individuals substituting labor supply for education when
faced with better survival odds. In a more controversial paper, Young (2005) argues that
exposure to HIV/AIDS initially induces labor scarcity by killing off active, working adults.
These deaths free up resources in the country and increase demand for workers, leading to
large, positive increases in wages. This wage increase, however, stimulates higher labor
force participation, as more individuals seek to bolster their household incomes, offsetting
the initial decline in the labor supply.16
My model also relates to the literature that studies the effects of incomes and wages
on the same three variables. I explore and investigate the impacts of differential income on
fertility, as in Kremer and Chen (1999) and de la Croix and Doepke (2003), on labor supply,
as in Chiappori (1988) and Doepke and Tertilt (2011), and on education, as in Acemoglu
and Pischke (2001) and Belley and Lochner (2007). However, unlike these studies which
only look at the partial equilibrium effects, much in the same vein as Boucekkine et al.
(2009), I examine the response of individuals in a model that accounts for both the health
and wage effects on optimal fertility, labor supply, and education decisions under both a
16A similar effect is seen with the Black Death epidemic. The Black Death is estimated to have killed 30-
60 percent of Europe’s total population. According to Herlihy (1997), sociologists and historians commonly
admit that this epidemic, while causing a large decline in the labor force, actually caused real wages to rise
rapidly, even well into the fifteenth century.
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partial equilibrium setting and within a general equilibrium framework, which can help
shed some light on the ongoing health and wealth debate.
2.3 Theoretical Model
As guidance for the empirical analysis, I develop a simple model to illustrate the theo-
retical impacts of uncertain survival probabilities on fertility, labor supply, and education
decisions. Assume a three-period overlapping generations model of identical agents with
one single final good. An individual born in period t (young age) spends all of his time en-
dowment on education, (et), and leisure, (1−et). His human capital accumulation, (ht+1),
which depends on his time investment into education and his parent’s human capital (or the
average human capital in his parent’s generation), (ht), is given by the following equation:
ht+1 = Aetht (2.1)
where A is a productivity parameter, with 0 < A< 1.
Survival to middle age and period t + 1 is certain, where the individual has (nt+1)
children. Raising children incurs a time cost, (v), which is a fixed amount of time v∈ (0,1).
Thus, the total time spent rearing children is (vnt+1). The individual allocates the rest of
his time working, (lt+1), which provides an exogenous wage per unit of time, (wt+1). Total
income, (yt+1), is given by:
yt+1 = ht+1lt+1wt+1 (2.2)
The individual then spends his labor income on middle-age consumption, (ct+1), and sav-
ings, (st+1), which he uses for consumption in old age (assuming he survives to this age).
The savings also provide interest income in the next period which depends on the interest
rate, (Rt+2). Only middle-age individuals work, and there is no child labor in the model.
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Social security mechanisms are also disregarded. Unlike the previous period, survival is
uncertain from the end of middle age to old age. Individuals still living in period t + 1
have some exogenous (pt+1) probability of survival to period t+2, where p ∈ (0,1).17 For
individuals surviving to old age, life becomes more modest: he retires (i.e. does not work)
and simply consumes (ct+2) from the savings (plus interest income) made in period t+1.
It is convention within this branch of literature to assume the existence of an actuarially fair
annuity market in this framework, where survivors obtain the savings plus interest of the
middle-aged individuals who die before reaching seniority. Accordingly, the rate of return
of the savings made in period t+1 is given by (Rt+2pt+1 ).
The utility function and preferences specification closely resembles the classic Beckar-
ian behavioral models of the 1980s. The utility of a surviving young adult individual born
in period t is given by:
U(et ,ct+1,nt+1, lt+1,ct+2) =
(1− et)1−σ
(1−σ) +
(ct+1)1−σ
(1−σ) +
(nt+1)1−σ
(1−σ) +
(1− vnt+1− lt+1)1−σ
(1−σ) + pt+1
(ct+2)1−σ
(1−σ) (2.3)
where σ denotes the usual positive intertemporal elasticity of substitution and is de-
fined as σ = 1γ .
18 The term γ (also called the inverse of the elasticity of substitution)
measures the percent change in the ratio of marginal utilities for a percent change in the
ratio of consumptions. A high value of γ (low intertemporal elasticity) implies insensitive
consumption growth while a low value for γ (high intertemporal elasticity) indicates very
sensitive consumption growth.
17Zhang and Zhang (2005) note that if the same rate of probability applies to survival from young age to
middle age, the quantitative and qualitative results are likely to be similar.
18In the case that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is equal to 1, the utility function becomes
logarithmic.
41
Unlike Zhang and Zhang (2005), I include disutility from education investment in the
first period of life, as time is a valuable commodity, and agents enjoy leisure in childhood.
Likewise, consistent with Young’s (2005) static preferences, and in order to observe the
labor supply response with regards to survival probability, I introduce disutility from work-
ing and raising children in the second period of life. Middle-aged individuals also enjoy
leisure, while working and rearing children reduces their utility. Finally, I focus more on
this iso-elastic specification for utility terms à la Becker and Barro (1988), which is aimed
for generality and simplification and will guarantee a precise identification of the effects at
work.19
The budget constraints for periods t+1 and t+2 are given by:
ct+1+ st+1 = wt+1lt+1ht+1 (2.4)
ct+2 =
Rt+2
pt+1
st+1 (2.5)
Combining equations (2.4) and (2.5), the intertemporal budget constraint is formed:
ct+1+ ct+2(
pt+1
Rt+2
) = wt+1lt+1ht+1 (2.6)
Optimal behavior is obtained by maximizing the utility function (equation 2.3) with
respect to the five decision variables (et , ct+1, nt+1, lt+1, ct+2) under the intertemporal
budget constraint (equation 2.6). Assume that (λt+1) is the Lagrange multiplier associated
with the intertemporal budget constraint. The first order conditions with respect to the five
decision variables (in order as they are listed) are:
19Discount factors are also eliminated from the utility function for these reasons. This omission will not
change the framework or the theoretical predictions in any meaningful manner.
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(1− et)−σ = λt+1ht lt+1wt+1 (2.7)
(ct+1)−σ = λt+1 (2.8)
(nt+1)−σ = (v)(1− vnt+1− lt+1)−σ (2.9)
(1− vnt+1+ lt+1)−σ = λt+1wt+1ht+1 (2.10)
(ct+2)−σ =
λt+1
Rt+2
(2.11)
In order to find and characterize optimal behavior, a solution for each of the decision
variables must be found under the time resource constraint, vnt+1 + lt+1 < 1, for given
wage, interest rate, and survival probability.20 The standard non-negativity restrictions are
also imposed in this setting, as well. Solving through this system provides a unique solution
for fertility, labor supply, and education:21
1− (1− vnt+1− v 1σ nt+1)[[ΓΩ(1+Γ(1− vnt+1− v 1σ nt+1)σ−1σ Ω) 1−σσ (1+ vσ−1σ )]+1] = 0
(2.12)
1− (lt+1)− (lt+1)(1+ vσ−1σ )(1+Γl
σ−1
σ
t+1 Ω)
1−σ
σ ΓΩ= 0 (2.13)
20The proof of a strictly positive, unique solution for this system is provided in the Chapter 2 Appendix.
21The derivations of solving this system for these solutions are provided in Appendix B.1.2-B.1.4.
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1− [[(1− et)(Ω)
−1
etΓ
]
σ
σ−1 ][1+(1+ v
σ−1
σ )(Γ)(Ω)(e
σ−1
σ
t )] = 0 (2.14)
where Γ= w
σ−1
σ
t+1 h
σ−1
σ
t and Ω= 1
1+(pt+1)(Rt+2)
1
σ −1
.
2.3.1 Optimal Behavior Under Exogenous Mortality/Health Shocks
Consider an epidemic shock that affects only the generation born in period t. Specifically,
the health shock only affects the middle-aged individuals of this generation, lowering the
chances of a longer life. This mimics the HIV/AIDS epidemic, which primarily hits the
young-to-middle aged individuals first, and lowers their chances of survival to old age. If
survival probability, (pt+1), decreases, optimal fertility, labor supply, and education deci-
sions will also be affected. This is seen in the following proposition.
Proposition 1: Under given wage, (wt+1), and interest rate, (Rt+2), an exogenous
decrease in the survival probability, (pt+1), will always increase fertility, (nt+1), and will
always decrease labor supply, (lt+1), education, (et+1), and savings, (st+1), for any σ
positive.22
These predictions confirm Zhang and Zhang’s (2005) and Boucekkine, Desbordes, and
Latzer’s (2009) results. In Zhang and Zhang’s model, declines in survival probability re-
duce the need for life-cycle consumption with respect to fertility, implying an increase in
fertility and decreases in education in the absence of disutility from working and rearing
children. Likewise, Boucekkine et al. also predict that decreases in survival probability
lead to increases in fertility and labor supply. In my model, the disutility of education
investment, working, and raising children is present, and confirms both model’s validity,
which ultimately shows their robustness. Here, a reduced survival rate to old age increases
the number of children a household has, reduces investments in education, and leads to
lower labor supply via income and substitution effects. The actuarially fair annuity market
22See Appendix B.1.5 for a proof of this proposition.
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allows middle-aged adults who survive to seniority to collect the insurance money of the
deceased and see their own intertemporal incomes increase under a diminishing rate to old
age. This increase in incomes raises fertility and reduces labor force participation because
there are now more resources available to the household. On the other hand, in a higher
mortality environment, there is less incentive to invest in education since human capital
investments will unlikely see its full value realized. Labor supply is also further decreased
for this reason, as there is less incentive to save and consume for old age. These compara-
tive statics can be seen in Figures 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3, which plot fertility, education, and labor
supply against survival probability for given levels of σ .
2.3.2 Optimal Behavior Under Exogenous Wage and Interest Rate Shocks
Before moving on to general equilibrium, I now turn my attention to how optimal behavior
is depicted when the wage and interest rate exogenously change. As mentioned before in
the literature review section, many studies have looked at the role wages have on fertil-
ity, labor supply, and education under uncertain survival probabilities. The intertemporal
framework modeled here now includes the impacts of another important variable: the in-
terest rate. It is obvious to see that when the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is log-
arithmic (σ = 1), neither the wage, (wt+1), nor the interest rate, (Rt+2), matter in fertility,
labor supply, or education decisions. Like in Proposition 1, there are two competing, well-
identified effects at play here: the income effect and the substitution effect. Higher wages
typically induce higher consumption and leisure, which reduces labor supply (through the
income effect) all the while raising the opportunity cost of leisure, which increases labor
supply (through the substitution effect). The same can be seen in fertility and education
decisions. Thus, the direction of change relies on the value σ takes. If σ = 1, these two
opposing effects have the same magnitude of impact and offset each other. In this case,
since labor supply is unaffected, neither is fertility nor education. Similarly, changes in the
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interest rate lead to the same conclusions. Higher interest rates lead to higher incomes and
result in lower savings and labor supply. On the other hand, the relative price of old-age
consumption to middle-age consumption is decreased, leading to higher workforce partici-
pation. Again, these effects offset each other under logarithmic preferences. These impacts
are more difficult to disentangle once the assumption of σ = 1 is relaxed. The easing of
this assumption leads to the next proposition.
Proposition 2: When the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is equal to 1 (σ = 1),
optimal fertility, labor supply, and education decisions are independent of wages and the
interest rate. For any σ > 1, an increase in the wage, (wt+1), leads to an increase in
fertility, (nt+1), and decreases in labor supply, (lt+1), and education, (et). A rise in the
interest rate, (Rt+2), has the same effects. For σ < 1, the results are reversed.23
The intuition behind these results lies once again with the income and substitution ef-
fects. Increases in the wage induce the income effect, which typically leads to larger life-
cycle consumption, additional leisure time, and more children, as individuals now have a
larger pool of resources to raise their children. The substitution effect, though, increases
the opportunity cost of both leisure and rearing children, leading to decreases in fertility.
Once again, the typical opposition between these two effects becomes apparent, leading to
ambiguous impacts on fertility. The same can be seen with the labor supply and education.
Higher wages make individuals invest less in education and leave the labor force but the
corresponding opportunity cost of leisure counteracts these decreases, leading to vague re-
sults. In order to say for certain what net changes in fertility, labor supply, and education
will take place, either the substitution effect must dominate the income effect or vice versa.
If σ > 1, the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is large enough that the income effect
is more predominant over the substitution effect, where fertility increases and education
and labor supply decrease in response to a wage increase. The same is true when changes
23See Appendix B.1.6 for a proof of this proposition.
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in the interest rate occur. When σ < 1, though, the substitution effect dominates, and the
opposite effects take place. These comparative statics can be seen in Figures 2.4, 2.5, and
2.6, which plot fertility, education, and labor supply against wages for given levels of σ .
In general, the empirical literature suggests that σ takes a value between 0.50 and 3.0.
Low estimates of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution range from 0.68 to 0.97 in
Hansen and Singleton (1983) to 1.2 to 1.8 in Szpiro (1986). Higher estimates range from
2.4 to 5.3 in Mankiw (1985) while Halek and Eisenhauer (2001) estimate it to be around
3.75. Here, I follow Doepke (2005) and Boucekkine et al.’s (2009) convention and assume
that σ < 1.24
2.3.3 General Equilibrium
In the previous two sections, I outlined how optimal fertility, labor supply, and education
adjust in response to exogenous shocks in mortality and wages/interest rates. The next
step is to close the model by creating a general equilibrium framework where both wages
and interest rates are endogenously determined. The result that follows will provide a
parallel theoretical synthesis to the approaches used both in Kalemli-Ozcan (2002) and
Young (2005).
To begin, I assume a Cobb-Douglas production function:
Yt = Kαt (ltLtht)
1−α (2.15)
where Kt is the stock of capital available in period t, lt is the labor supply, Lt is the
size of the active population (assumed to be homogeneous), ht is human capital, α is the
capital share, and (1−α) is the labor share. There is no scope for technological progress,
24Some studies, however, including Dustmann and Windmeijer (2000) and Cordoba and Ripoll (2013)
assume that σ > 1.
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and capital fully depreciates after one period. At equilibrium, the capital accumulation
function is given by the following equality:
Kt+1 = Ltst (2.16)
where st measures the savings of the active population.
Under perfect competition, both the labor factor and the capital factor are paid at their
marginal productivities, which yield the following price equations:
wt = (1−α)( KtltLtht )
α (2.17)
and
Rt = α(
Kt
ltLtht
)α−1 (2.18)
Finally, population growth within the model is assumed to evolve according to the fol-
lowing law of motion:
Lt+1 = ntLt (2.19)
where nt is the population growth rate.
The relevant prices for an individual born in period t are the wages, (wt+1), and the
interest rate, (Rt+2). Using equations (2.16) to (2.19), expressions can be found for both
the wage and interest rate under this general equilibrium setting:
wt+1 = (1−α)( stnt lt+1ht+1 )
α (2.20)
and
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Rt+2 = α(
st+1
nt+1lt+2ht+2
)α−1 (2.21)
These two results lead to the general equilibrium implications:
Proposition 3: In general equilibrium, when σ < 1, a decrease in survival probability,
(pt+1), causes wages, (wt+1), to unambiguously to increase. Therefore, a decrease in
longevity, (pt+1), has an ambiguous effect on fertility, (nt+1), labor supply, (lt+1), and
education, (et).
Exogenous shocks to both survival probabilities and wages were performed in the par-
tial equilibrium sections, where negative impacts on each shock had opposing and contrast-
ing effects. This property is shown to hold in general equilibrium, as well. According to
Proposition 1 (under the assumption that σ < 1), a decrease in survival probability, (pt+1),
will lead to increases in fertility, (nt+1), and decreases in both labor supply, (lt+1), and
education, (et). By equation (2.20), this decrease in survival probability leads to an unam-
biguous increase in the wage, (wt+1) (caused by the drop in labor supply). This increment
in wages, though, also has its own effects as seen in Proposition 2, which induces the oppo-
site effects on these economic variables. Thus, this effect may counteract or even outweigh
the direct positive effect of a decrease in survival probability, leading to ambiguous expec-
tations. For σ > 1, however, the theoretical predictions are more clear-cut. Decreases in the
survival probability will directly lead to increases in fertility and decreases in labor supply
and education (Proposition 1), and through its impacts on wages, will also indirectly lead to
the same effects (Proposition 2). As before, the decrease in the labor supply causes wages
to increase, but since now the income effect is more prominent, more resources are avail-
able to the household, inducing further increases in fertility and decreases in labor supply
and education investment. Thus, there is no ambiguity in this situation.
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2.4 Empirical Strategy
2.4.1 Description of the Data
The ambiguous theoretical predictions suggest that proper understanding of the links be-
tween health and fertility, health and the labor supply, and health and education relies on
empirical work. Instead of focusing on the macro-level data which has been typically used
in the literature, I follow the approaches of Soares (2006) and Jayachandran and Lleras-
Muney (2009), who use micro-level data. Using 113 DHS in 36 SSA countries taken from
the years 1986-2014, I calculate and construct my own measures of fertility, mortality, and
life expectancy. Building this new panel data set provides several advantages to the data
and the ensuing estimations. First, using micro-level data opens up the number of countries
and years available to use. I cover 36 SSA countries with responses that range from 1975-
2014, which is unique in its coverage and scope, as most related studies do not cover this
region due to lack of reliable data.25 Second, since vital registration systems are usually
underdeveloped in emerging countries (especially in SSA), this inevitably leads a shortage
of reliable and consistent records. Since I base my calculations on actual reported variables
from the surveys instead of simulated or generated data, more accurate measures and fig-
ures can be obtained for several countries over a longer time frame. Finally, since data is
at the individual level, I can construct measures that are age-specific, region-specific, and
time-specific. This implies that I can exploit differences in the data that are beyond the
usual cross-country variation–an important distinction that sets this strategy and methodol-
ogy apart from the past literature.
In order to construct measures of fertility, mortality, and life expectancy, I use the typ-
ical calculations and definitions of each variable used by the World Health Organization
(WHO). A full detailed explanation of the formulas used is provided in the Chapter 2 Ap-
25Some responses in the surveys go as far back as 1959, but the number of these types of responses is
limited. Thus, I focus on the periods where consistent data and responses are available.
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pendix. Similar to Young (2005), I use birth histories of individuals to create measures of
birth rates and child mortality rates separated by region and by year. In each survey, adult
women (aged 15 to 49) answer a variety of demographic questions including: the number
of children that are in the household, the year each child was born in, the gender of each
child, and the year each child died (if child passed away). These responses are used to
calculate my measures of fertility rates and child mortality rates. For fertility rates, I take
the total number of births in the region (by year and age of the mother) and divide it by
the total number of women in the region (also by year and age of the mother). Similarly, I
calculate the child mortality rate in a particular country by taking the proportion of children
who died in the year to the number of children who were still alive at the beginning of the
year.
Adult mortality rates are more difficult to calculate due to the fact that many deaths go
unreported and are not included in the surveys. However, the surveys do provide informa-
tion on the respondent’s siblings (if they have any), which covers their gender, their date of
birth, and their date of death (if he/she passed away). I use this information on siblings to
construct adult mortality rates in the same vein as child mortality rates. These constructed
average age-specific and gender-specific death rates are shown in Tables 2.1 and 2.2. The
data appear to align well with other macro-level data, starting with high infant mortalities
followed by lower young-age mortalities, and finally ending with high adult mortalities.
This U-shaped pattern suggests that the HIV/AIDS epidemic has hit the youngest and old-
est generations in SSA particularly hard. Also, as established in the literature, female
mortality rates appear to be lower than male mortality rates for all age groups within in this
sample.
There may be concerns about potential biases when constructing the adult mortality
variable. First, estimations could be downwardly biased since not all individuals who died
may be represented. Households where all adult members died or dead individuals with no
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siblings are not counted since there is no one to report on them in the DHS. Second, esti-
mations could be upwardly biased since respondents (who are alive), are not taken into the
mortality calculation. Also, the experiences of respondents may be counted several times
regarding the same dead sibling. Trussell and Rodriguez (1990) show that these biases can-
cel one another out under a random sample, provided that the reported mortality rates are
not correlated with the number of siblings. Bicego (1997) and Timaeus and Jasseh (2004)
confirm this result and show that estimations using sibling histories usually estimate mor-
tality rates fairly accurately. In addition, Oster (2010) shows that the correlation is more of
a concern for infant mortality, and not for adult mortality, which is my primary focus. In
order to ease any further concerns about potential biases, though, I incorporate the adjust-
ments proposed by Gakidou and King (2006) and Cohen and Soto (2007), which includes
both a weighting function and an extrapolation method for providing more accurate mea-
sures of adult mortality using sibling histories. These two additions should increase the
reliability measures of the data and the subsequent construction of the variables.
Finally, since I model forward-looking behavior in the theoretical framework, I create
measures of life expectancy by converting the age-specific mortality rates calculated in
the beginning of this section. These measures are shown in Tables 2.3 and 2.4, showing
both life expectancy at birth and life expectancy at age 15. While many SSA countries
do show improvements in health over the past 35 years, it has not necessarily translated
to gains in economic growth or development. The data further showcase the impact of
HIV/AIDS in these countries. Health progress essentially stalled from the 1990s, with the
largest developments coming only in the most recent years. It should also be noted that
high-HIV countries have endured the brunt of the epidemic, having the lowest growth in
life expectancies in the sample.26
26I use Young’s (2005) convention to depict high-HIV countries as countries that have a 5 percent or
greater prevalence of HIV. Countries are labeled as low-HIV countries otherwise.
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2.4.2 Empirical Methodology
The empirical model, using a sample of 36 SSA countries, will focus on the forward-
looking behavior of individuals under exogenous epidemic shocks and its respective im-
pacts on fertility, labor supply, and education. The identification of the overall effects will
bring a clear empirical answer to the ambiguous theoretical predictions, providing some
reconciliation to the literature.
Before beginning, it is important to note that my estimation procedure needs to solve
three different issues. First, there may be unobserved time-invariant, country-specific fac-
tors that are correlated with the regressors. Second, there may be substantial measurement
error in both the independent variables and the dependent variables. In the absence of
other endogeneity issues, ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation would be sufficient to
strain out these errors, but the estimates may be biased and inconsistent for all parame-
ters. Finally, most of the explanatory variables are likely to be jointly determined with
the independent variable in question, which will lead to endogeneity issues. In order to
correct these issues, I utilize two econometric techniques: first-differencing and instru-
ments. Taking first-differences of the regression equation eliminates the time-invariant,
country-specific effect, correcting some of the potential biases and measurement error in
the estimations. The use of instruments is valid for removing endogeneity issues, assuming
one (or more) suitable variables can be found. The selection of an acceptable instrument
proves difficult to find in this realm of literature, so instead, I turn to “internal” instruments
provided by the system-GMM estimation developed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and
Blundell and Bond (1998). Normally, under the assumptions that the error term is not seri-
ally correlated and that the explanatory variables are weakly exogenous (i.e. uncorrelated
with future realizations of the error term), lagged values of the endogenous variables are
typically used as “internal” instruments when no external instruments can be found (Arel-
lano and Bond (1991)). However, this approach leads to several statistical disadvantages.
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First, it ignores the cross-country dimension of the data, which is vital for straining out the
variations between countries. Second, estimations using lagged values of the explanatory
variables suffer from severe small sample biases and produces very imprecise estimates
(Blundell and Bond (1998)). These drawbacks can be negated, though, by exploiting in-
formation in levels through the use of system-GMM estimation. This method combines
two regression equations: (1) the regression equation in differences, which is instrumented
with lagged levels of the regressors, and (2) the regression equation in levels, instrumented
with the lagged differences of the regressors. Thus, the cross-country variation is preserved
and past changes may be more predictive of current levels than past levels are of current
changes. Furthermore, lagged differences of the explanatory variables are valid and appro-
priate instruments under the additional assumption that there is no correlation between the
differences of these variables and the country-specific effect.
According to Blundell and Bond (1998) and Blundell, Bond, and Windmeijer (2000),
the system-GMM estimator greatly improves on the previous econometric methods in terms
of both bias and precision when the explanatory variables are persistent over time, and when
the number of time periods is sufficiently small enough. Since this is the case I find myself
in, I will proceed in this manner.
In order to justify the use of the system-GMM estimator, three different specification
tests will be utilized, as suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991) and Arellano and Bover
(1995). The first test is a Sargan-Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions which tests
the validity of the instruments and is robust under the presence of heteroskedasticity and
autocorrelation. It also tests if the instruments are correctly specified within the model and
if the error terms are uncorrelated with the instruments themselves. The second test is the
“difference in Sargan-Hansen test” which examines the efficacy of the subset of instruments
employed for the equation in levels (i.e. the lagged differences of the regressors). Finally,
the estimations are tested on second-order serial correlation in the differenced error. If
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the differenced error is serially correlated in the second degree, it implies first-order serial
correlation in levels, which would bias the outcomes.
2.4.3 Effect on Fertility
The relationship between fertility and life expectancy is given by the following formula:
FertilityRateart = β0+β1Ln(Li f eExpectancyart)+ψa+ωr+φt+θrt+ εart (2.22)
where FertilityRateart and Li f eExpectancyart are described by the fertility rate and life
expectancy definitions outlined in the previous section. The subscripts a, r, and t denote
the particular age group, region, and year observed, respectively. The termsψ, ω, φ , and θ
denote age-group fixed effects, region-specific fixed effects, year fixed effects, and region-
specific time trends, respectively, while ε is the error term. While the data allows for annual
observations, there is a high likelihood of serial correlation, which could lead to an under-
statement of the standard errors. To avoid this issue, I used five-year intervals in the data
(1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, and 2010) and aggregate the single-year age
categories into five-year age groups (15-19, 20-24, 25-29, 30-34, and 35-39), as well.
The estimation results are provided in Table 2.5. For the overall sample, using OLS
(columns 1, 4, and 7) shows that the relationship between life expectancy and fertility is
negative, which suggests that as life spans increase, the quality of children matters more
than the quantity of children. The effects also appear to be stronger in low-HIV countries
compared to high-HIV countries. First-differenced estimates (columns 2, 5, and 8) and es-
timation by system-GMM (columns 3, 6, and 9) are presented along with the OLS results
in order to overcome omitted-variable bias and endogeneity issues, respectively. The esti-
mates are consistent and confirm the signs in the OLS regression, although the magnitudes
have decreased to some extent. To justify the use and validity of the system-GMM esti-
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mator, three statistical tests are also reported with the results. Neither the Sargan-Hansen
test of over-identifying restrictions, which evaluate the validity of the full set of instru-
ments, nor the Difference in Sargan-Hansen test, that focuses on the additional instruments
used by the system-GMM estimation, can reject the null hypothesis that the instruments
are exogenous (i.e. uncorrelated with the current error term). Likewise, no evidence of
second-order serial correlation of the differenced residuals is found, providing additional
support for the appropriate number of lags of the explanatory variables used as “internal”
instruments. Overall, the validity of the instruments is never rejected, and thus, appears to
satisfy the necessary moment conditions for consistency under the system-GMM estimator.
The results suggest that a one percent increase in life expectancies is expected to decrease
the number a children a woman has by about 0.02. For the SSA sample in my panel data
set, life expectancies rose by about 20 percent in the past 35 years, indicating that the fer-
tility rate has decreased by about 0.48. Interpreted along with my theoretical framework,
the results also imply that the negative, direct impact of increasing longevity outweighs the
positive, indirect effect of wages on fertility.
2.4.4 Effect on Labor Supply
The relationship between labor supply and life expectancy is given by the following equa-
tion:
LaborForceParticipationRateart = β0+β1Ln(Li f eExpectancy15ct)+
ψa+ωr+φt+θrt+ εart (2.23)
where LaborForceParticipationRateart is the fraction of people who report to be work-
ing and Li f eExpectancy15rt is the life expectancy of an individual at age 15. Like the pre-
vious estimation equation, the subscripts a, r, and t denote the particular age group, region,
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and year observed, respectively. Age-group effects, region-specific fixed effects, year fixed
effects, and region-specific time trends are also included, and are denoted with the terms
ψ, ω, φ , and θ , respectively. Since the DHS does not provide substantial information on
work histories or wages, I am forced to use labor force participation rates, which are only
observed during the years when the surveys are conducted. Thus, I only include countries
where at least two surveys with appropriate data are available, which reduces the sample
size substantially, but still allows me to utilize region and time fixed effects.
The estimation results are provided in Table 2.6, which mimics the previous table, but
now divides each category into an additional subset: females (Panel A) and males (Panel
B). The relationship between longevity and labor supply is positive although the results
are mixed according to gender. The results are positive and significant for females in both
high- and low-HIV countries while in males, it is only marginally significant. The results
for females are also much stronger than those of males, suggesting that women benefit more
in the workplace than men from an improvement in life expectancies. The results show that
a one percent increase in life expectancies at age 15 leads to a 0.0034 percent increase in
the female labor force participation rate while it leads to approximately a 0.0030 percent
increase in the male labor force participation rate. Thus, for my SSA sample, the female
labor force participation rate rose by roughly 2.44 percent, and for males, it rose by about
2.08 percent. Intuitively, the results once again suggest that the direct effect of increasing
life expectancy outweighs the indirect effect of wages on the labor supply.
2.4.5 Effect on Education
The relationship between education and life expectancy is given by the following estimation
equation:
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Yearso fEducationcr = β0+β1Ln(Li f eExpectancy15ct)+ηc+ωr+ξcr+ εcr (2.24)
where Yearso fEducationcr is defined as the average years of schooling an individual
obtains when his/her cohort is 5 to 15 years old, and Li f eExpectancy15ct is the average
number of years a 15-year old is expected to live when his/her cohort is 5 to 15 years
old. The subscripts c refers to 5-year birth cohorts while r refers to the region. The terms
η , ω , and ξ denote the cohort fixed effects, the region fixed effects and the region-specific
cohort trends, respectively. I restrict my attention to the 5-15 year cohort because education
decisions are usually made during an individual’s school-going age and not afterwards.
Thus, a 25-year old individual who experiences an increase in life expectancy will not
necessarily increase their own education because the return on their investments is unlikely
to be realized. The change in life expectancy, though, will be reflected in their children’s
educational investment.
The estimation results are shown in Table 2.7, which once again parallels the setup of
the previous tables. The results show that both males and females are likely to increase
their own education as life expectancies increase, with the larger effects affecting males. In
my SSA sample, for an additional one-year percentage gain in life expectancies at age 15,
women are predicted to have increased their years of schooling by about 0.20 years while
men have increased it by about 0.25 years. It is plausible to find larger effects on males,
as it has been established in the literature that under unfavorable conditions and scarcity of
resources, households tend to favor the well-being of males over females. Combined with
the theoretical framework, it suggests that the direct impact of increasing lifespans induces
larger investments in education, which outweighs the negative, indirect effect of wages.
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2.5 Conclusion
This paper contributes to the existing literature on both a theoretical level and on an empiri-
cal front. Theoretically, I built an OLG framework which models individual’s behavior and
their optimal fertility, labor supply, and education decisions under uncertain survival prob-
abilities. I first studied the effects in partial equilibrium where wages and the interest rate
were exogenously given, then built the model up to general equilibrium, where the prices
were endogenous. While increasing longevity has clear-cut results in partial equilibrium, in
general equilibrium, there is an ambiguous impact on fertility, labor supply, and education
decisions due to the counteractive nature of substitution and income effects.
The theoretical model is complemented with an empirical application which utilizes
data from the DHS. Building age-specific birth rates, age-specific death rates, and life ex-
pectancies from 113 DHS, I construct my own panel data set which covers 36 SSA coun-
tries from the time period 1975-2010. Using system-GMM as an econometric instrument
to overcome endogeneity issues, the results suggest that increases in life expectancy lead
to reductions in fertility, and increases in the labor supply and education investment. The
data show that the direct impacts of the health shock outweigh the indirect wage effect on
all three variables. Overall, the results suggest that increases in life expectancy will have a
positive impact on economic growth and development.
Further research may want to enhance the theoretical model by including uncertain sur-
vival probabilities from young age to middle age. This opens up the range of shocks that can
be modeled, and is more realistic of an individual’s life cycle. Exogenous shocks in child
survival rates may lead to different predictions than the ones found in this paper. Further
focus on the savings mechanism also proves to be a worthwhile venture as in Boucekkine
and Laffargue (2008), as many of the optimal decisions depend on the level of savings an
individual holds. Also related to this topic, one can study the resulting effects of inequality
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in the economy that may occur with health shocks, as some groups may fare better than
others in the advent of a health crisis or epidemic.
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Figure 2.1: Response of Fertility to Survival Probability 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 2.2: Response of Education to Survival Probability 
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 Figure 2.4: Response of Fertility to Wages 
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1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Ages 0-4 153.55 149.91 144.56 143.42 146.26 146.63 129.49
Ages 5-9 27.39 26.74 25.79 25.58 26.09 26.16 23.10
Ages 10-14 17.56 17.14 16.53 16.40 16.73 16.77 14.81
Ages 15-19 16.96 16.56 15.97 15.85 16.16 16.20 14.31
Ages 20-24 19.10 18.65 17.98 17.84 18.19 18.24 16.11
Ages 25-29 21.04 20.54 19.81 19.65 20.04 20.09 17.75
Ages 30-34 27.22 26.58 25.63 25.43 25.93 26.00 22.96
Ages 35-39 27.74 27.08 26.11 25.91 26.42 26.49 23.39
Ages 40-44 44.37 43.32 41.77 41.44 42.26 42.37 37.42
Ages 45-49 33.40 32.61 31.45 31.20 31.82 31.90 28.17
Average Mortality (Ages 0-49) 38.83 37.91 36.56 36.27 36.99 37.08 32.75
Average Infant Mortality (Ages 0-14) 66.17 64.60 62.29 61.80 63.02 63.18 55.80
Average Adult Mortality (Ages 15-49) 27.12 26.48 25.53 25.33 25.83 25.90 22.87
Notes: Average death rates are calculated using 113 DHS from 36 SSA countries. Death rates are measured per 1000 population.
Table 2.1:  Mean Age-Specific Death Rates
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1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Ages 0-4 152.30 148.69 143.38 142.25 145.07 145.44 128.44
Ages 5-9 26.45 25.82 24.90 24.70 25.19 25.25 22.30
Ages 10-14 16.20 15.82 15.25 15.13 15.43 15.47 13.66
Ages 15-19 16.44 16.05 15.47 15.35 15.66 15.70 13.86
Ages 20-24 16.87 16.48 15.89 15.76 16.07 16.11 14.23
Ages 25-29 18.54 18.10 17.45 17.31 17.66 17.70 15.63
Ages 30-34 22.71 22.17 21.38 21.21 21.63 21.69 19.15
Ages 35-39 25.85 25.24 24.34 24.15 24.62 24.69 21.80
Ages 40-44 38.04 37.14 35.81 35.53 36.23 36.33 32.08
Ages 45-49 42.16 41.17 39.70 39.38 40.16 40.26 35.56
Average Female Mortality (Ages 0-49) 37.56 36.67 35.36 35.08 35.77 35.86 31.67
Average Female Infant Mortality (Ages 0-14) 64.98 63.44 61.18 60.69 61.90 62.05 54.80
Average Female Adult Mortality (Ages 15-49) 25.80 25.19 24.29 24.10 24.58 24.64 21.76
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Ages 0-4 196.96 192.30 185.43 183.97 187.61 188.08 166.10
Ages 5-9 37.09 36.21 34.92 34.64 35.33 35.42 31.28
Ages 10-14 20.92 20.42 19.69 19.54 19.93 19.98 17.64
Table 2.2:  Mean Age-Specific Death Rates by Gender
Panel A: Female Age-Specific Death Rates
Panel B: Male Age-Specific Death Rates
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Ages 15-19 17.39 16.98 16.37 16.24 16.57 16.61 14.67
Ages 20-24 20.93 20.43 19.71 19.55 19.94 19.99 17.65
Ages 25-29 23.40 22.85 22.03 21.86 22.29 22.35 19.74
Ages 30-34 26.26 25.63 24.72 24.52 25.01 25.07 22.14
Ages 35-39 34.54 33.72 32.51 32.26 32.90 32.98 29.12
Ages 40-44 44.73 43.67 42.11 41.77 42.60 42.71 37.72
Ages 45-49 45.60 44.52 42.93 42.59 43.44 43.55 38.46
Average Male Mortality (Ages 0-49) 46.78 45.67 44.04 43.69 44.56 44.67 39.45
Average Male Infant Mortality (Ages 0-14) 84.99 82.98 80.01 79.38 80.95 81.16 71.67
Average Male Adult Mortality (Ages 15-49) 30.41 29.69 28.63 28.40 28.96 29.04 25.64
Notes: Average death rates are calculated using 113 DHS from 36 SSA countries. Death rates are measured per 1000 population.
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1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Benin 45.09 47.23 49.93 53.42 54.82 55.19 58.73
Burkina Faso 41.61 46.00 49.25 49.37 49.34 50.35 57.05
Burundi 45.22 47.26 48.79 48.00 48.80 51.49 54.83
Cameroon 48.75 51.21 52.84 53.59 53.22 51.94 53.69
Central African Republic 45.88 48.87 49.87 49.02 46.85 44.60 47.63
Chad 43.29 44.67 46.05 46.92 47.40 47.58 49.86
Comoros 47.88 50.60 53.82 56.65 58.70 59.44 61.83
Republic of the Congo  54.80 56.09 56.49 55.03 52.19 50.59 59.14
Democratic Republic of the Congo  45.16 46.30 47.65 48.99 49.07 50.00 56.90
Cote d'Ivoire 47.74 50.71 52.59 52.61 49.56 46.70 50.15
Ethiopia 44.03 43.74 44.63 47.10 49.31 51.93 61.30
Gabon 50.79 54.95 59.09 61.24 60.83 59.34 62.12
Gambia 42.21 46.35 50.03 52.21 53.49 55.58 59.34
Ghana 50.81 52.27 54.11 56.75 57.50 56.99 60.61
Guinea 38.48 41.26 45.45 49.92 51.70 51.24 56.31
Kenya 55.02 57.83 59.60 58.80 54.46 50.79 58.72
Lesotho 50.76 53.67 56.25 59.33 56.84 47.18 47.48
Liberia 42.73 46.02 47.32 47.20 50.16 52.41 59.44
Madagascar 47.11 49.03 49.71 51.01 54.61 58.47 63.36
Table 2.3:  Life Expectancy at Birth
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Malawi 42.77 44.74 45.05 43.77 43.48 44.08 56.84
Mali 35.92 39.61 43.48 46.46 47.65 48.90 56.18
Mozambique 41.49 41.90 41.77 43.13 45.90 48.69 53.23
Namibia 55.19 57.68 59.84 61.22 60.09 55.12 62.48
Niger 37.28 39.40 41.72 43.95 47.13 50.70 58.26
Nigeria 43.40 45.55 46.35 46.11 46.11 46.62 51.33
Rwanda 44.90 47.99 50.45 33.49 31.63 48.19 61.40
Sao Tome and Principe 58.94 60.51 60.93 61.77 62.57 63.29 65.85
Senegal 43.52 48.94 53.90 57.18 57.38 57.77 64.01
Sierra Leone 38.49 40.65 40.32 37.35 35.72 38.69 48.23
South Africa 54.58 56.97 59.91 62.12 61.37 55.84 54.39
Sudan 53.62 54.24 54.76 55.51 56.53 57.97 62.04
Swaziland 50.98 54.23 57.37 59.35 56.39 48.66 48.35
Tanzania 48.87 50.47 50.95 49.98 48.69 50.47 61.63
Togo 49.50 52.30 54.63 55.85 54.72 53.47 57.28
Zambia 51.11 51.50 48.73 44.31 42.04 43.46 56.38
Zimbabwe 56.69 59.39 61.86 59.58 50.24 41.69 49.57
Average 47.07 49.45 51.26 51.62 51.29 51.26 56.83
Low-HIV Countries 49.26 52.21 53.33 53.28 53.74 53.64 57.02
High-HIV Countries 42.36 45.97 46.78 47.22 47.34 47.11 49.24
Notes: Life expectancy measures are calculated from 113 DHS from 36 countries. Low-HIV countries are defined as countries that have an HIV prevalence
rate of 5% or less. High-HIV countries are defined as countries that have an HIV prevalence rate of more than 5%. Data is measured in years.
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1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Benin 38.99 40.85 43.18 46.20 47.40 47.73 50.79
Burkina Faso 35.98 39.78 42.59 42.69 42.67 43.54 49.34
Burundi 39.10 40.87 42.19 41.51 42.20 44.52 47.42
Cameroon 42.15 44.28 45.70 46.34 46.02 44.91 46.43
Central African Republic 39.68 42.26 43.13 42.39 40.51 38.57 41.19
Chad 37.44 38.63 39.83 40.58 40.99 41.14 43.12
Comoros 41.40 43.75 46.54 48.99 50.76 51.40 53.47
Republic of the Congo  47.39 48.51 48.85 47.59 45.13 43.75 51.15
Democratic Republic of the Congo  39.05 40.04 41.21 42.37 42.43 43.24 49.20
Cote d'Ivoire 41.29 43.85 45.48 45.49 42.86 40.38 43.37
Ethiopia 38.08 37.83 38.60 40.73 42.64 44.91 53.01
Gabon 43.92 47.52 51.10 52.96 52.60 51.32 53.72
Gambia 36.50 40.08 43.27 45.15 46.26 48.06 51.32
Ghana 43.94 45.20 46.79 49.08 49.73 49.28 52.41
Guinea 33.28 35.68 39.31 43.17 44.71 44.31 48.69
Kenya 47.58 50.01 51.54 50.85 47.09 43.92 50.78
Lesotho 43.90 46.41 48.65 51.31 49.15 40.80 41.06
Liberia 36.95 39.80 40.92 40.82 43.38 45.32 51.40
Table 2.4:  Life Expectancy at Age 15
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Madagascar 40.74 42.40 42.99 44.11 47.23 50.57 54.79
Malawi 36.99 38.69 38.95 37.85 37.60 38.12 49.15
Mali 31.06 34.26 37.60 40.18 41.21 42.28 48.58
Mozambique 35.88 36.23 36.12 37.29 39.69 42.10 46.03
Namibia 47.72 49.88 51.75 52.95 51.97 47.67 54.03
Niger 32.24 34.08 36.08 38.01 40.76 43.84 50.38
Nigeria 37.53 39.39 40.08 39.88 39.88 40.32 44.39
Rwanda 38.83 41.50 43.63 28.96 27.36 41.68 53.10
Sao Tome and Principe 50.97 52.33 52.69 53.42 54.11 54.73 56.95
Senegal 37.63 42.32 46.62 49.45 49.62 49.95 55.36
Sierra Leone 33.29 35.15 34.87 32.30 30.89 33.46 41.71
South Africa 47.20 49.27 51.81 53.72 53.07 48.29 47.04
Sudan 46.37 46.91 47.35 48.01 48.89 50.14 53.65
Swaziland 44.09 46.89 49.61 51.32 48.77 42.08 41.81
Tanzania 42.26 43.64 44.06 43.22 42.11 43.64 53.29
Togo 42.81 45.23 47.25 48.30 47.32 46.24 49.54
Zambia 44.20 44.54 42.14 38.32 36.35 37.58 48.76
Zimbabwe 49.02 51.36 53.49 51.53 43.45 36.05 42.87
Average 40.71 42.76 44.33 44.64 44.36 44.33 49.15
Low-HIV Countries 42.60 45.15 46.12 46.08 46.47 46.39 49.31
High-HIV Countries 36.63 39.75 40.45 40.83 40.94 40.74 42.58
Notes: Life expectancy measures are calculated from 113 DHS from 36 countries. Low-HIV countries are defined as countries that have  an HIV 
prevalence rate of 5% or less. High-HIV countries are defined as countries that have an HIV prevalence rate of more than 5%. Data is measured in years.
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OLS
(1)
FD
(2)
SYS-GMM
(3)
OLS
(4)
FD
(5)
SYS-GMM
(6)
OLS
(7)
FD
(8)
SYS-GMM
(9)
Life Expectancy
-3.1247***
(0.8548)
-2.4035***
(0.7693)
-2.0451***
(0.7895)
-2.7110***
(0.9214)
-2.2809***
(0.7723)
-1.8627***
(0.7863)
-2.0653***
(0.7212)
-1.7633***
(0.7020)
-1.4129***
(0.7159)
Controls
Countries 36 36 36 20 20 20 16 16 16
Number of Observations 
(Country x Year x Age Group)
7344 5875 7344 4080 3264 4080 3264 2611 3264
Arellano-Bond AR(2) p-Value 0.7732 0.7143 0.6915
Sargan-Hansen J-Test Statistic p-Value 0.2996 0.3802 0.2615
Difference in Sargan-Hansen Test Level p-Value 0.3365 0.4007 0.2932
Notes: This table reports the effects of life expectancy on fertility using OLS, First-Differences, and "System-GMM" estimation. Low-HIV countries are defined as countries that have an HIV
prevalence of 5% or less while high-HIV countries are defined as countries that have more than 5% HIV prevalence. Years used in the regressions include 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005,
and 2010. Women are divided into five groups according to a particular age group: 15-19, 20-24, 25-29, 30-34, and 35-39. Regression are weighted by the number of women by age group
 by country by year. Standard errors are clustered at the country by year level. Significance is defined as: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 2.5: Effect of Life Expectancy on Fertility: 1975-2010
Region Fixed Effects, Year Fixed Effects, Region-Specific Time Trends, Age-Group Fixed Effects
All Countries Low-HIV Countries High-HIV Countries
Dependent Variable: Age-Specific Birth Rates by Country by Year
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OLS
(1)
FD
(2)
SYS-GMM
(3)
OLS
(4)
FD
(5)
SYS-GMM
(6)
OLS
(7)
FD
(8)
SYS-GMM
(9)
Log Life Expectancy at 15 
0.5139**
(0.2420)
0.3455*
(0.1923)
0.2890**
(0.1238)
0.6177**
(0.3069)
0.5681*
(0.3133)
0.4285**
(0.2151)
0.4818**
(0.2454)
0.3883*
(0.1985)
0.3496**
(0.1647)
Controls
Countries 30 30 30 18 18 18 12 12 12
Number of Observations 
(Country x Year x Age Group)
2570 2013 2570 1430 1118 1430 1140 895 1140
Arellano-Bond AR(2) p-Value 0.5418 0.6203 0.5333
Sargan-Hansen J-Test Statistic p-Value 0.2237 0.2791 0.1965
Difference in Sargan-Hansen Test Level p-Value 0.3064 0.3329 0.2792
OLS
(10)
FD
(11)
SYS-GMM
(12)
OLS
(13)
FD
(14)
SYS-GMM
(15)
OLS
(16)
FD
(17)
SYS-GMM
(18)
Log Life Expectancy at 15 
0.2606*
(0.1429)
0.1867*
(0.1019)
0.2252*
(0.1323)
0.1337*
(0.0738)
0.1042*
(0.6194)
0.1976*
(0.1040)
0.2504*
(0.1474)
0.2691*
(0.1542)
0.2983*
(0.1557)
Table 2.6: Effect of Life Expectancy on Labor Force Participation: 1975-2010
Region Fixed Effects, Year Fixed Effects, Region-Specific Time Trends, Age-Group Fixed Effects
Panel (B): Male Cohort in Sample
Dependent Variable: Labor Force Participation by Age Group by Country by Year
All Countries Low-HIV Countries High-HIV Countries
Panel (A): Female Cohort in Sample
Dependent Variable: Labor Force Participation by Age Group by Country by Year
All Countries Low-HIV Countries High-HIV Countries
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Controls
Countries 30 30 30 18 18 18 12 12 12
Number of Observations 
(Country x Year x Age Group)
2055 1525 2056 1158 847 1158 897 678 897
Arellano-Bond AR(2) p-Value 0.4275 0.3286 0.2410
Sargan-Hansen J-Test Statistic p-Value 0.1988 0.2139 0.1725
Difference in Sargan-Hansen Test Level p-Value 0.2437 0.2591 0.2036
Notes: This table reports the effects of life expectancy on labor force participation using OLS, First-Differences, and "System-GMM" estimation. Low-HIV countries are defined as countries that have an HIV prevalence 
of 5% or less while high-HIV countries are defined as countries that have more than 5% HIV prevalence. Only countries with more than one DHS are included in the regressions. Regressions are weighted by the
population in each year, age group, country, and gender. Standard errors are clustered at the country by year level. Significance is defined as: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
Region Fixed Effects, Year Fixed Effects, Region-Specific Time Trends, Age-Group Fixed Effects
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OLS
(1)
FD
(2)
SYS-GMM
(3)
OLS
(4)
FD
(5)
SYS-GMM
(6)
OLS
(7)
FD
(8)
SYS-GMM
(9)
Life Expectancy at 15 1.4287***
(0.3867)
1.2311**
(0.3563)
1.1096**
(0.5222)
1.0804**
(0.4608)
0.9965**
(0.4498)
0.9612**
(0.4459)
0.8555***
(0.3967)
0.9036**
(0.3835)
0.8019*
(0.4531)
Log Linear Cohort x Region 0.0742*
(0.0422)
0.0893*
(0.0492)
0.0761*
(0.4002)
0.1322*
(0.7282)
0.1767*
(0.1032)
0.1697*
(0.0930)
0.0345*
(0.0930)
0.0928*
(0.0489)
0.0624*
(0.0328)
Controls
Countries
36 36 36 20 20 20 16 16 16
Number of Observations 
(Country x Year x Age Group)
1248 932 1248 694 518 694 554 414 554
Arellano-Bond AR(2) p-Value
0.6321 0.5721 0.4836
Sargan-Hansen J-Test Statistic p-Value
0.2388 0.1919 0.1884
Difference in Sargan-Hansen Test Level p-Value
0.2975 0.2660 0.2161
OLS
(10)
FD
(11)
SYS-GMM
(12)
OLS
(13)
FD
(14)
SYS-GMM
(15)
OLS
(16)
FD
(17)
SYS-GMM
(18)
Table 2.7: Effect of Life Expectancy on Education: 1975-2010
Dependent Variable: Years of Schooling by Cohort by Country 
Panel (A): Female Cohort in Sample
Panel (B): Male Cohort in Sample
Region Fixed Effects, Cohort Fixed Effects, Region-Specific Cohort Trends
Dependent Variable: Years of Schooling by Cohort by Country 
All Countries Low-HIV Countries High-HIV Countries
All Countries Low-HIV Countries High-HIV Countries
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Life Expectancy at 15 1.6349***
(0.4598)
1.3541**
(0.5277)
1.2087**
(0.5303)
1.2655*
(0.6509)
1.0149*
(0.5499)
1.0322*
(0.5698)
0.9902*
(0.5468)
0.9727*
(0.5586)
0.9384*
(0.5536)
Log Linear Cohort x Region 0.0983*
(0.0542)
0.1004*
(0.0573)
0.0895*
(0.0473)
0.1929*
(0.1041)
0.2247*
(0.1325)
0.1699*
(0.0889)
0.1564*
(0.0863)
0.1302*
(0.0758)
0.0955*
(0.0512)
Controls
Countries
36 36 36 20 20 20 16 16 16
Number of Observations 
(Country x Year x Age Group)
1015 768 1015 564 396 564 451 371 451
Arellano-Bond AR(2) p-Value
0.4211 0.3865 0.3553
Sargan-Hansen J-Test Statistic p-Value
0.3713 0.3048 0.2832
Difference in Sargan-Hansen Test Level p-Value
0.4044 0.3206 0.3189
Notes: This table reports the effects of life expectancy on education using OLS, First-Differences, and "System-GMM" estimation. Low-HIV countries are defined as countries that have an HIV prevalence of 5% or less 
while high-HIV countires are defined as countries that have more than 5% HIV prevalence. The 5-year birth cohorts are 1970-1974, 1975-1979, 1980-1984, 1985-1989, 1990-1994, 1995-1999, 2000-2004, 
and 2005-2009. Regressions are weighted by the population in each cohort, country, and gender. Standard errors are clustered at the country by year level. Significance is defined as: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
Region Fixed Effects, Cohort Fixed Effects, Region-Specific Cohort Trends
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CHAPTER 3
WHAT YOU EXPORT MATTERS REVISITED
3 Introduction
3.1 Motivation
Can a country’s specialization patterns predict its future subsequent economic growth?
Does it mater if these countries latch on to a specific export or import basket? Can countries
grow simply by restructuring their trade configurations? These questions (and more) have
been at the forefront of the international trade literature for decades due to the important
implications it has on sustained economic development and growth.
To answer such questions, economists have long relied on theoretical models with in-
creasing returns, network effects, technological spillovers, or a combination of the ideas as
in Porter (1990), Fujita, Krugman, and Venables (1999), and Banerjee and Munshi (2004).
Endogenous growth models have also been prevalently used to illustrate how specializing
in some particular goods may be more growth promoting than specializing in other items.
In such frameworks, externalities play a major role, particularly with learning-by-doing,
which exhibits spillovers among goods. Stokey (1988) shows that learning reinforces ex-
isting patterns of production, and that once an international pattern of specialization is
established, it persists. Therefore, once the initial pattern of comparative advantage is es-
tablished, it is simply exacerbated as the production occurs. Young (1991) further extends
this model, integrating the comparative effects of international trade, suggesting that de-
veloping countries will experience dynamic losses from trade while developed countries
will experience dynamic gains due to the countries specializing in one good over another.
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These gains are prevalent whether one looks in the agricultural or manufacturing sectors as
in Matsuyama (1992).27
However, empirically testing these endogenous growth models has been difficult be-
cause there is little data or estimates to show which particular types of goods are most likely
to generate such spillovers. Hausmann and Rodrik (2003), Evenson and Westphal (1995),
and Lall (2000) begin the steps to formally model these frameworks where production
and indeterminacy maps into economic performance in a straightforward and empirically
verifiable way using mechanisms such as “cost discovery”, “blueprints” (standard tech-
nologies), and domestic factor endowments. Hausmann, Hwang, and Rodrik (2007) extend
these ideas by establishing a particular hierarchy in goods space that is both amenable to
empirical measurement and has determinate growth implications. To do so, they create a
quantitative index that ranks goods in terms of their implied productivity. They construct
this measure by taking a weighted average of the per-capita GDPs of the countries ex-
porting a product, where the weights reflect the revealed comparative advantages of each
country in that product. So for each good, an associated income/productivity level (which
is called PRODY) is generated. By calculating the export-weighted average of the PRODY
for a country, the income/productivity level that corresponds to a country’s export basket
(which is called EXPY) is then constructed. Thus, this measure of EXPY is utilized as the
gauge of the productivity level associated with a country’s specialization pattern. Using
EXPY, the authors show that, holding all else constant, countries that specialize in the type
of goods that rich countries export are more likely to grow faster than countries that spe-
cialize in other types of goods. Here, countries literally become what they produce; rich
countries tend to latch onto “rich-country” products while poor countries tend to latch onto
“poor-country” products.
27Further studies that explore this area of learning spillovers on long-run growth include Grossman and
Grossman (1991), Aghion and Howitt (1988), and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2003).
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Several other studies have gone on to extend this work in order to provide a better
account of global trade. Hummels and Klenow (2005) show that richer countries export
not just more goods, but also a broader variety of goods, while Schott (2004) indicates
that specialization occurs not only within product categories but also across products. This
specialization in goods stems from a variety of factors, but a related branch of empirical
literature focuses on the natural resource curse, which examines the relationship between
specialization in primary products and economic growth (Sachs and Warner (1995)), the
rationale of which is based either on the Dutch disease or on an institutional explanation
(Subramanian and Sala-i-Martin (2003)).
While Hausmann, Hwang, and Rodrik’s (2007) work and results have been used as a
guide for international economic agencies and countries worldwide to promote export pro-
motion policies, there are a few considerable problems that we see that could impugn the
validity of the outcomes. Most importantly, we find that the transparency in both the data
collection and in the methodologies used is not sufficient enough in order to create a signif-
icant econometric statement, and therefore, the results should not be taken seriously until
this issue is corrected. There are several instances of the authors failing to mention how
they reduce their sample size, where they obtain data from, and what specific variables
they use in the regressions. These transparency issues are particularly important, espe-
cially in modern empirical trade research, because from a technical standpoint, a clearer
methodology legitimizes the results and provides a foundation to test the robustness of the
conclusions. We address this matter by replicating their work and reverse-engineering their
processes to the best of our abilities. In each step, we provide more clarity to both the
data and methods in order to corroborate the findings. We then test the robustness of these
results by using imports in our data rather than exports and also create our own measures of
productivity/income levels for each good and country, respectively called import PRODY
and IMPY. Like exports, imports can reveal a country’s comparative advantage in goods
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and their associated productivity levels.This is an essential procedure because if results
turn out to be significant using the same processes as the authors, then the data show that
what countries import also matters for trade, and that countries should be pursuing freer
and more open trade as well as international integration policies, rather than just export
promotion policies.
Using a similar framework as Hausmann, Hwang, and Rodrik (2007), we create an
index of the “income level of a country’s imports” using data from the United Nations
COMTRADE database. Our analysis expands the sample size to 149 countries while cov-
ering the 1992-2003 time period. Although our measure of IMPY is highly correlated with
per-capita GDPs and behaves like EXPY in aggregate, we find that it is not a significant
predictor of subsequent economic growth, controlling for standard covariates. These re-
sults hold under both ordinary least squares and instrumental variable specifications. Since
we are not aware of any other study that utilizes imports in this manner, we conclude in
favor of previous research findings, suggesting that what countries specialize in and export
is a major determinant of economic growth.
The outline of the rest of the paper is as follows. Section 3.2 leads with the empirical
strategy and a analysis of the results obtained. Section 3.3 concludes with a discussion and
comparison to previous research.
3.2 Empirical Strategy
3.2.1 Construction of IMPY
In order to construct our measure of IMPY, we follow the same methods Hausmann,
Hwang, and Rodrick (2007) use in their construction of EXPY. Like EXPY, IMPY is a
measure calculated from import statistics and aims to capture the productivity level associ-
ated with a country’s imports. In order to calculate IMPY, we rank commodities according
to the income levels of the countries that import them. Controlling for overall economic
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size, commodities that are imported by rich countries get ranked more highly than com-
modities that are imported by poor countries. With these commodity-specific calculations,
we then construct country-wide indices.
First, an index called PRODY is created, which is a weighted average of the per-capita
GDPs of countries importing a given product and represents the income level associated
with that product. A higher PRODY value for goods indicates that high-income countries
tend to import more of these goods than do low-income countries.
Let countries be indexed by j and individual goods (x) be indexed by l. Total imports
(X) of country j equals:
X j =∑
l
x jl (3.1)
Let the per-capita GDP of country j be denoted Y j. Then the productivity level associ-
ated with product k, PRODYk, equals:
PRODYk =∑
j
(x jk/X j)
∑ j(x jk/X j)
Y j (3.2)
The numerator of the weight, (x jk/X j), is the value share of the commodity in the
country’s overall import basket. The denominator of the weight, ∑ j(x jk/X j), aggregates
the value shares across all countries importing the goods. Thus, the PRODY index repre-
sents a weighted average of per-capita GDPs, where the weights correspond to the revealed
comparative advantage of each country in good k.
Like the previous authors, the rationale for using revealed comparative advantage as a
weight rather than by other means is to ensure that country size does not distort the ranking
of goods. For example, although the United States may import more goods (in total value
and total volume) than most other countries, a singular good may only constitute a small
fractional percentage of total U.S. imports. Given the equation above, the PRODY index
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allows us to weight U.S. income less heavily than a country who imports the good as a
higher percentage of their total imports. Thus, the total value or volume of the imported
good does not affect the index rankings but rather the percentage weight of the goods (as a
fraction of total imports) is what drives the productivity level in that good.
With this PRODY index, we can then construct a measure of a country’s productiv-
ity level in regards to the goods that they import. The productivity level associated with
country i′s import basket, IMPYi, is in turn defined by the following equation:
IMPYi =∑
l
(
xil
Xi
)PRODYl (3.3)
This is a weighted average of the PRODY index for that country, where the weights are
simply the value shares of the products in the country’s total imports.28
3.2.2 Description of the Data
Our trade data comes from the United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database (COM-
TRADE). We gather data on over 5000 products at the Harmonized System (HS) 6-digit
level for the years 1992 to 2003, in which the value of imports is measured in current U.S.
dollars. Like Hausmann, Hwang, and Rodrick (2007), we construct PRODY measures for
countries that reported trade data in each of the years of 1999, 2000, and 2001 in order to
obtain a reliable sample of countries since the number of countries that report trade data
varies considerably from year to year. However, unlike the authors, who use a sample of
113 countries, we were able to obtain a consistent sample of 149 countries in our calcula-
tions. Real per-capita GDP data from the World Development Indicators (WDI) database
28A similar index is generated in Michaely (1984), who uses 3-digit HS category levels. The primary
difference between this index is that Michaely uses a different weighting scheme, with each country’s weight
corresponding to the market share in global exports of the relevant commodity. However, this approach may
overweight large countries.
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was then matched to each country under our sample for each time period.29 Thus, we were
able to construct an import PRODY index which includes a sample of 149 countries using
PPP-adjusted GDP data.
The average PRODY from 1999-2001 is then used to construct an IMPY measure for
all countries reporting trade data during the period from 1992-2003. Since the number of
countries reporting COMTRADE data varies from year to year, and the coverage is espe-
cially patchy for earlier years, the total number of countries for which we could calculate
IMPY ranges from a low of 49 in 1992 to a high of 141 in 2003.30 Table 3.1 shows this
coverage of IMPY for each of the years between 1992-2003.
3.2.3 Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics for mean PRODY calculated at PPP-adjusted GDP levels are shown
in Table 3.2. As the table reveals, the income level associated with individually-traded
commodities varies greatly in range, from numbers in the low thousands to values in the
tens of thousands (in constant 2000 US dollars). This reflects the fact that specialization
and trade patterns are highly dependent on per-capita incomes.31
We take a closer look at the specific commodities with the smallest and largest import
PRODY values in Table 3.3. As we expect, items with low import PRODY values tend to
29The authors claim that trade data was available for 124 countries, and real GDP per capita data was
available for 113 countries over the 1999-2001 time period, which leads them to their sample size of 113
countries. We were unable to isolate which sample of countries were used in these calculations due to the
lack of transparency in their data description and methods. The sample of 149 countries that we use had both
trade and real GDP per capita data for the same time periods, providing a larger but still consistent sample of
countries, which negates the non-reporting bias in the index (since nonreporting is likely to be correlated with
income). A full listing of countries is provided in the Chapter 3 Appendix. Even in the export PRODY and
EXPY replication, we found that data was available for 149 countries. The difference in sample size did not
significantly alter the statistics or ranking of either PRODY or EXPY, nor did it change the regression results.
Thus, we felt comfortable in proceeding with the larger sample size in our calculations and estimations.
30Our replication of EXPY ranged from a low of 48 countries in 1992 to a high of 133 in both 2000 and
2001.
31Compared to our replication of EXPY, our measure of IMPY had more observations and a wider range
of values but less variation in the data (smaller standard deviation).
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be less complex goods or commodities that require some sort of transformation in order to
be useful. Consider for example, Product 151919, “industrial monocarboxylic fatty acids”,
which are used primarily in the production of food products, soft drinks, soaps, and as a
preservative. One of the reasons this product has the lowest income level is that it con-
stitutes a relatively large and significant part of the imports of Burundi and Mozambique,
two of the countries that have the lowest per-capita GDPs in our sample.32 However, the
commodities with the largest import PRODY values tend to be more complex goods, such
as Product 880250, “spacecraft and satellites”, which holds a substantial share of Luxem-
bourg’s imports, the country with the highest per-capita GDP in our sample. The correlation
between primary goods and import PRODY may not be as strong as on the export PRODY
side, but this table still shows that the scope of imports is a bit more varied across countries
than are exports. We find that rich countries do import the commodities that relatively poor
countries import (oftentimes larger in value and volume) but not as a greater percentage of
their import baskets.
We turn our attention to IMPY in Table 3.4 and Figure 3.1 which summarizes some
basic summary statistics. For the sample of countries included, we note that mean IMPY,
much like mean EXPY, exhibits a downward trend over time. Since 1992, mean IMPY has
fallen from $11,050 to $9,485 in 2003.33 There are two plausible reasons for this decline.
First, the composition of countries changes over the time period (with more low-income
countries being added to the sample) and second, partly due to the reduction in IMPY levels
in many of the countries. Indeed, Table 3.5 shows that the majority of countries (among
those that have IMPY values throughout our sample period) have experienced a reduction
in IMPY over time. This downward trend, however, as Hausmann, Hwang, and Rodrik
32It is interesting to note that flat-rolled iron (Product 721031) and hot-rolled iron (Product 720813) were
two of the goods that ranked in the top percentile for highest value in export PRODY in Hausmann, Hwang,
and Rodrik (2007), and it shows up in the bottom percentile under our measure of import PRODY.
33Mean EXPY fell from $12,672 to $10,350 during the same time frame.
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(2007) note, may be specific to the recent periods and dependent on levels of aggregation,
since 4-digit trade data does not show the same trend.
How does IMPY vary across countries? Figure 3.2 shows a scatter plot of IMPY against
per-capita GDP. Like EXPY, there is a strong correlation between the two variables. It
should be unsurprising that rich (poor) countries import products that tend to be imported
by other rich (poor) countries. The relationship between IMPY and per-capita GDP partly
exists by construction, since a commodity’s PRODY is determined by the per-capita GDPs
of the countries that are important importers of that commodity. However, the relationship
is not just purely a mechanical one. Calculating country-specific PRODY by excluding own
imports from the calculations of these measures does not change the results significantly.
The variation in IMPY across countries is also much lower than the variation in per-capita
GDPs. This could, perhaps, be a direct consequence of the fact that PRODY (and therefore
IMPY) is a weighted average of national income levels.
Table 3.6 shows countries with the smallest and largest IMPY values for 2003 (the year
with the largest possible sample size). As expected, countries with the smallest IMPY
values tend to be developing countries in Africa and western Asia, while countries with the
largest IMPY values are developed countries in Europe and eastern Asia. Unlike EXPY,
there does not appear to be a significant case in which one country particularly stands
as an outlier in terms of ranking. However, there are a few situations where countries
appear to have disproportionate IMPY values relative to their per-capita GDPs. A few cases
where countries appear to have very large IMPY values relative to their per-capita GDPs
are Thailand (THA), India (IND), China (CHN), South Korea (KOR), Mexico (MEX).
In a couple of these instances, the culprit can be seen with a specific commodity with a
high PRODY value. For example, Product 854211, “digital monolithic integrated circuits”
contributes heavily to South Korea’s import basket, and this product has a relatively large
PRODY value of $17,139. The same can be seen with Mexico and Product 847330, “parts
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and accessories of data processing equipment”. However, in the remaining cases (Thailand,
India, and China), this is the result of a portfolio of a high PRODY of imports, and not one
or two specific items. These countries appear to have a very diversified set of imports,
with no single product category dominating in terms of high import shares. It may be
worth remembering that at this juncture, these countries have been experiencing very rapid
economic growth. There are also countries that have a relatively low IMPY value relative
to their per-capita GDPs. Fiji (FJI), Algeria (DZA), Guyana (GUY), Mauritius (MUS),
and Sri Lanka (LKA) all have lower IMPY values that what their per-capita GDPs would
suggest. Once again, the reasoning can be seen in either a specific commodity (Fiji, Algeria,
and Sri Lanka with Product 271000, “oils, petroleum, bituminous, except crude”)34 or with
the entire import basket (Guyana and Mauritius).
Figure 3.3 shows the time trend for IMPY for China, India, and a sample of other Asian
and Latin American countries. Among the Latin American countries included (Argentina,
Brazil, Chile, and Mexico), only Mexico has a level of IMPY that is comparable to those
in East Asia. This probably reflects the fact that the imports of the other three are heavily
based on primary products and natural resources, which tend to have lower IMPYs. Among
all countries in this sample, we notice an slight upward trend, except for Chile, whose
IMPY has been steadily drifting downwards over time. At the other end, Hong Kong and
South Korea have the highest IMPYs. Notice how China has significantly closed the gap
with these countries throughout this time period. China’s IMPY has converged with that
of Hong Kong and South Korea, even though their per-capita GDPs are nearly five times
larger (in PPP-adjusted terms). Also, China’s IMPY now exceeds that of Brazil, Argentina,
and Chile, even though China’s per-capita GDP is roughly half as large as those Latin
American countries. Along the same lines, India also shows signs of significant IMPY
34This product has a relatively low PRODY value of $5,466.
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growth. While not as spectacular as China’s growth, but it has slowly begun to converge to
the comparatively richer Latin American countries.
How do countries abundant in natural resources fare under our measure of IMPY? Fig-
ure 3.4 shows a similar chart for five countries rich in natural resources: Canada, Norway,
New Zealand, Australia, and Chile. The variation in IMPY among these countries turns
out to be significant. Once again, Chile is at the bottom of the scale. However, even among
the remaining four advanced countries, the range is quite large. Norway’s IMPY is approx-
imately 15-20 percent larger than New Zealand’s or Australia’s. Therefore, our measure
seems to capture important differences among natural resource rich countries, as well.
3.2.4 Determinants of IMPY
In this section, we detail some of the fundamental determinants of the variation across
countries in levels of IMPY. Our process thus far has shown that IMPY is highly corre-
lated with per-capita GDP. The previous models laid out in the early part of this paper have
pointed to human capital and the size of the labor force as two key determinants. Hu-
man capital extends the range of “discoverable” goods in which countries can specialize
in while the labor force promotes cost discovery through lower wages. Therefore, to show
these implications in cross-national data, we utilize two measures of human capital and two
instruments of country size. Our first measure of human capital is the Penn World Table’s
Human Capital Index, which is an indicator of human capital per person based on years
of schooling and returns to education. Our second estimate of human capital comes from
Barro and Lee (2011), which uses the average years of total schooling for the population
aged 15 years and older.35 To proxy country size, we obtain data from the Penn World
Tables using total population and land area (in square kilometers). Finally, we also include
35Because we were unable to isolate which human capital variables Hausmann, Hwang, and Rodrik (2007)
use, we show results for each of the regressions using both measures. We do the same in our replication
process.
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a control of institutional quality, which is proxied by the World Bank’s Rule of Law Index,
which captures the perceptions of the extent to which citizens of a country have confidence
in and abide by the rules of society.36 In order to stay consistent with the previous research,
we show the results for 2001, although the other time periods provide parallel conclusions.
Tables 3.7 and 3.8 show these determinants of IMPY (each using a different measure of
human capital), which gives some credence to previous models’ predictions. Both human
capital and country size are positively related with IMPY, even when controlling for GDP
per capita. However, it may be difficult to attribute the relationship with human capital
a direct contributory interpretation since the causal effect may go from IMPY to human
capital rather than vice versa. It may be easier, though, to think of the relationship with
country size in causal terms: it is rather difficult to believe that there would be reverse
causality from IMPY to population size or land area. Surprisingly, institutional quality
does not seem to be strongly associated with IMPY. Thus, it makes it less likely that it is
a substitute for the broad institutional characteristics of a country. Overall, our measure of
IMPY behaves similarly to Hausmann, Hwang, and Rodrik’s (2007) measure of EXPY.
Even if we ascribe a causal role to per-capita income and human capital, there is quite
a lot that remains unexplained in the determination of IMPY. Figures 3.5 and 3.6 (once
again each using a different measure of human capital) show a scatter plot of the deviations
from the cross-country norms established in column four of Tables 3.7 and 3.8 against
per-capita GDP (i.e. taking the predicted values of IMPY and comparing it to the actual
values of IMPY in terms of percent deviation, then plotting each country’s deviation with
log GDP). In both cases, we see that there are big outliers in both directions. Mozambique
(MOZ), Kenya (KEN), Malawi (MWI), China (CHN), and Madagascar (MDG) have IMPY
levels that are much higher than would be predicted on the basis of the right-hand variables
in Tables 3.7 and 3.8 while Benin (BEN), Togo (TGO), Bangladesh (BGD), Honduras
36Other specific measures included in this index are: the quality of contract enforcement, property rights,
the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.
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(HND), and Sri Lanka (LKA) all have much lower IMPYs. In general, these same countries
were also seen as outliers under the EXPY measure. Thus, if such differences matter to
subsequent economic performance, a deeper understanding of how and where they arise
from is needed. These fundamentals only explain a small portion of the story.
3.2.5 IMPY and Growth
In this section, we finally turn to the relationship between IMPY and economic growth.
Our process thus far has shown that IMPY has checked off all of the major empirical
assessments that EXPY does, and that imports behave extremely comparably to that of
exports. So the final check is to see if imports exhibit the same effects on growth. To
do so, we analyze the relationship in a cross-national setting and using a wide variety of
estimation techniques.
Tables 3.9 and 3.10 show a set of cross-national regressions in which economic growth
is regressed on initial levels of IMPY (each using one of our two different specifications of
human capital). The maximum time span that can be used for these regressions based on
COMTRADE data is a time horizon of 12 years (1992-2003). However, this leaves us with
a sample size of only about 45 countries. By focusing on a somewhat shorter time frame of
10 years (1994-2003), we can obtain nearly an additional 30 countries into the regressions.
The tables show results with both samples. Certain covariates are also added to the regres-
sions as control variables. All regressions include per-capita GDP and a measure of human
capital (Penn World Tables Human Capital Index in Table 3.9 and Barro and Lee (2011)
Total Schooling in Table 3.10) since both have specific roles in previous models’ theoretical
specifications. To account for some of the neoclassical explanations of economic growth,
the physical capital-labor ratio and the Rule of Law Index described in the previous section
is also included. To calculate the capital-labor ratio, we take a country’s gross capital for-
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mation (measured in LCUs)37 and divide it by the country’s population. Results are shown
under both OLS and IV specifications. For the IV specification, we instrument IMPY with
a country’s population and land size. Like in the previous section, we view both as plau-
sibly exogenous with respect to IMPY levels and economic growth. While excludability
from the second-stage regression can be viewed as problematic, it is difficult to find scale
effects with these measures in the growth empirics. Thus, both population and country size
is quite reasonable in this situation.
In all regression specifications, we find that IMPY enters with a moderately large and
positive coefficient. However, none of these results are statistically meaningful at any rea-
sonable level of significance. The estimated coefficient varies from 0.0149 to 0.0883, with
the IV results generally being larger than the OLS estimates. The statistical tests show-
ing the strength of the instruments varies from column to column. The F-tests generally
indicate that the instruments are not jointly significant, with nine out of the twelve cases
falling under the threshold critical value. Overidentification tests using the Sargan-Hansen
J-statistic cannot reject excludability in the shorter time periods (1994-2003). However, in
the longer time frame (1992-2003), the null hypothesis of zero correlation of the instru-
ments with the second-stage residuals is rejected. Human capital (for both measures) only
appears significant in the shorter time interval, while the Rule of Law Index coefficients
are mixed in significance. Physical capital does not enter in a robustly significant way in
any specification. Thus, the results here suggest that IMPY has no significant causal rela-
tionship with economic growth and is not a particularly satisfactory proxy for the factor or
institutional endowments of a country.
37Data is obtained from the World Bank and refers to the net increase in physical assets, not accounting
for the consumption of fixed capital or land purchases.
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3.2.6 Discussion
Our results show that while a country’s import basket behaves much like their export bas-
ket in aggregate in several aspects, it does not have the same relationship with economic
growth. In fact, we have revealed that there is no statistically significant association be-
tween what countries import and long-run economic growth, even after controlling for
initial income per capita, human capital, and other time-invariant country statistics. Our
measure of IMPY checks off many of the same empirical and statistical boxes that EXPY
does, but, in the end, is not a reliable predictor of economic performance. Thus, our find-
ings provide an analogous confirmation and verification to Hausmann, Hwang, and Rodrik
(2007), showing that countries that export goods correlated with higher productivity levels
grow more rapidly than countries that specialize in lower productive commodities.
More broadly, our calculations suggest that the type of goods in which a country spe-
cializes has important implications for subsequent economic growth. Holding everything
constant, an economy is better off producing goods that have a higher productivity level
or making goods that richer countries export. A country’s fundamentals generally allow
it to produce more sophisticated goods than it currently produces, and countries can stuck
either with higher-income goods or lower-income goods for this reason. On the other side,
imports have no statistically significant relationship with economic growth, and what coun-
tries import has no bearing on its standard of living (at least from a growth standpoint).
Thus, if countries want to grow, a primary focus on the type and quality of goods they
export, not import, matters.
3.3 Conclusion
We have shown in this paper that there are econometrically meaningful differences in the
specialization patterns of countries worldwide. We captured these differences by develop-
ing an index that measures the “quality” and productivity/income level of countries’ export
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and import baskets, in the same vein as Hausmann, Hwang, and Rodrik (2007). We pro-
vided evidence that shows that countries that latch onto or export a set of goods that are
ranked higher on this quality spectrum tend to perform better economically, while imports
do not factor in significantly into this relationship. The clear implication from these out-
comes is that the gains from globalization and trade depend on the ability of countries
to appropriately position themselves along this scale. Thus, countries and international
agencies should be solely pursuing export promotion policies rather than international inte-
gration programs that target both exports and imports in order to ensure sustained long-run
economic growth.
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Variable Number of Observations Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
Mean PRODY, 
1999-2001, 
PPP-Adjusted
5,037 10,957 4,401 1,001 52,100
Product
Smallest
151919
283693
721031
846939
720813
Largest 880250
720441
540310
750110
251730
Table 3.1: Sample Size of IMPY
Table 3.3: Largest and Smallest Import PRODY Values (2000 US$)
Year
1993
1992
1994
108
116
1995
1996
1997
Number of Reporting Countries
49
63
84
98
Hot rolled iron or non-alloy steel, 
coil,w >600mm, t 3-4.75mm, 355 mpa
119
127
138
139
140
141
2001
2002
2003
1998
2000
1999
Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics for Import PRODY (2000 US$)
Product Name
Industrial monocarboxylic fatty acids, 
nes, acid oils
Bismuth carbonate
Flat rolled iron or non-alloy steel, 
electro plate/zinc,<3mm/275,>3/355
Typewriters, non-electric < 12 kg
Mean PRODY, 1999-
2001
1,002
1,302
1,073
1,385
30,658
Spacecraft, satellites and spacecraft 
Waste from the mechanical working of 
iron or steel nes
Hi-ten yarn not sewing, viscose rayon, 
not retail
Nickel mattes
Tarred macadam
1,405
52,101
43,105
38,080
32,454
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Year Number of Observations Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
1992 49 11,050 1,809 6,726 13,771
1993 63 10,788 1,754 7,148 13,738
1994 84 10,353 1,693 7,104 13,459
1995 98 9,487 2,027 5,564 13,256
1996 108 9,316 1,960 5,526 12,975
1997 116 9,296 1,877 5,505 12,775
1998 119 9,275 1,982 5,195 13,000
1999 127 9,899 2,078 4,465 14,113
2000 138 9,892 2,010 6,124 14,691
2001 139 9,590 1,964 5,776 13,738
2002 140 9,425 1,889 5,664 14,376
2003 141 9,485 1,813 5,834 13,195
Increase
Decrease
IMPY
Smallest 5,834
5,852
5,978
6,151
6,349
Largest 13,196
13,016
12,871
12,770
12,607
Table 3.4: Descriptive Statistics for IMPY (2000 US$)
Table 3.5: Number of Countries that Show an Increase/Decrease in IMPY, 1992-2003
IMPY, ppp
14
35
Ireland
Table 3.6: Countries with Smallest and Largest IMPYs
Reporter
Togo
Comoros
Gambia, The
Niger
Benin
Luxembourg
Hong Kong, China
Switzerland
Japan
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log GDP per Capita
0.1695***
(23.05)
0.1493***
(13.39)
0.1428***
(9.60)
0.1360***
(10.65)
Log Human Capital
0.0829*
(1.97)
0.0830*
(1.97)
0.0928**
(2.57)
Rule of Law Index
0.0094
(0.66)
0.0204
(1.66)
Log Population
0.0372***
(6.22)
Log Land Area
-0.0113**
(-2.59)
Constant
7.681***
(119.79)
7.802***
(108.04)
7.857***
(71.16)
7.439***
(65.17)
Observations 137 119 119 119
R-Squared 0.7973 0.8403 0.8409 0.8867
Robust t-statistics in parentheses. Significance is defined as: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,* p<0.1.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log GDP per Capita
0.1695***
(23.05)
0.1616***
(15.12)
0.1517***
(6.20)
0.1423***
(10.51)
Log Human Capital
0.0327
(1.33)
0.0348
(1.42)
0.0417**
(1.99)
Rule of Law Index
0.0108
(0.72)
0.0231*
(1.77)
Log Population
0.0365***
(5.98)
Log Land Area
-0.0108**
(-2.46)
Constant
7.681***
(119.79)
7.695***
(114.17)
7.779***
(68.12)
7.386***
(63.75)
Observations 137 116 114 114
R-Squared 0.7973 0.8301 0.8383 0.8838
Robust t-statistics in parentheses. Significance is defined as: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,* p<0.1.
Table 3.7: Correlates of IMPY  (Human Capital = Penn World Tables Human Capital Index)
Dependent Variable: Log IMPY (2001)
Table 3.8: Correlates of IMPY  (Human Capital = Barro and Lee (2011) Total Schooling)
Dependent Variable: Log IMPY (2001)
94
OLS OLS OLS IV IV IV OLS OLS OLS IV IV IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Log Initial GDP per Capita
-0.0045
(-2.52)**
-0.0083
(-1.84)*
-0.0090
(-1.89)*
-0.0181
(-2.56)**
-0.0137
(-2.44)**
-0.0118
(-2.54)**
-0.0145
(-2.24)**
-0.0109
(-1.78)*
-0.0144
(-2.05)**
-0.0138
(-2.44)**
-0.0213
(-1.93)*
-0.0258
(-2.54)**
Log Initial IMPY
0.0239
(0.50)
0.0195
(0.19)
0.0295
(0.54)
0.0149
(0.54)
0.0421
(0.23)
0.0318
(0.54)
0.0247
(0.69)
0.0228
(0.59)
0.0404
(0.89)
0.0397
(0.74)
0.0933
(1.33)
0.0883
(1.32)
Log Human Capital
0.0341
(1.48)
0.0224
(0.91)
0.0340
(1.54)
0.0231
(0.99)
0.0478
(3.18)***
0.0362
(2.34)**
0.0456
(3.03)***
0.0352
(2.29)**
Log Capital-Labor Ratio
0.0012
(0.09)
0.0014
(0.12)
0.0039
(0.04)
0.0035
(0.34)
Rule of Law Index
0.0103
(1.66)
0.0095
(1.17)
0.0105
(2.44)**
0.0091
(2.07)**
Constant
-0.1612
(-0.43)
-0.0252
(-0.06)
-0.3513
(0.80)
-0.7929
(-0.52)
-0.2801
(-0.19)
-0.1829
(-0.15)
-0.1956
(-0.70)
-0.1392
(-0.45)
-0.0689
(-0.22)
-0.3141
(-0.75)
-0.6966
(-1.25)
-0.6002
(-1.12)
F-Statistic on Instruments
(First Stage)
1.56 1.49 2.08 2.89 3.52 4.75
Sargan-Hansen J-Statistic p-Value 0.0413 0.0362 0.0445 0.1031 0.1136 0.1159
Number of Observations 47 44 42 46 44 42 82 75 73 82 75 73
R
2 0.0061 0.0538 0.1128 0.0322 0.0442 0.1091 0.0195 0.1446 0.1897 0.0172 0.1049 0.1339
Notes: Robust t-statistics in parentheses. Instruments for the IV regressions include log population and log land area. Significance is defined as: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,* p<0.1.
Table 3.9: Cross-National Growth Regressions (Human Capital = Penn World Tables Human Capital Index)
Dependent Variable: Growth Rate of GDP per Capita Dependent Variable: Growth Rate of GDP per Capita  
1992-20003 1994-2003
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OLS OLS OLS IV IV IV OLS OLS OLS IV IV IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Log Initial GDP per Capita
-0.0045
(-2.52)**
-0.0232
(-2.29)**
-0.0279
(-2.70)***
-0.0181
(-2.56)**
-0.0380
(-1.74)*
-0.0369
(-1.71)*
-0.0145
(-2.24)**
-0.0146
(-2.13)**
-0.0282
(-2.91)***
-0.0138
(-2.44)**
-0.0258
(-2.38)**
-0.0325
(3.23)***
Log Initial IMPY
0.0239
(0.50)
0.0286
(1.63)
0.0415
(0.79)
0.0549
(0.54)
0.0665
(1.11)
0.0991
(0.75)
0.0247
(0.69)
0.0433
(1.14)
0.0308
(0.83)
0.0397
(0.74)
0.0489
(1.47)
0.1118
(1.55)
Log Human Capital
0.0271
(1.78)*
0.0189
(1.20)
0.0265
(1.73)*
0.0189
(1.28)
0.0338
(3.50)***
0.0283
(2.92)***
0.0335
(3.48)***
0.0282
(2.94)***
Log Capital-Labor Ratio
0.0021
(0.19)
0.0029
(0.27)
0.0034
(0.37)
0.0066
(0.69)
Rule of Law Index
0.0140
(2.46)**
0.1277
(2.16)**
0.0114
(2.74)***
0.0105
(2.50)**
Constant
-0.1612
(-0.43)
-0.5976
(-1.53)
-0.1578
(-0.38)
-0.7929
(-0.52)
-0.2358
(-1.08)
-0.6111
(-0.58)
-0.1956
(-0.70)
-0.3198
(-1.07)
-0.1385
(-0.47)
-0.3141
(-0.75)
-0.8816
(-1.70)*
-0.7733
(-1.58)
F-Statistic on Instruments
(First Stage)
1.56 2.87 2.72 2.89 6.15 7.98
Sargan-Hansen J-Statistic p-Value 0.0413 0.0606 0.0820 0.1031 0.1830 0.1871
Number of Observations 47 44 41 46 43 41 82 73 71 82 73 71
R
2 0.0061 0.1432 0.2698 0.0322 0.0794 0.2448 0.0195 0.1705 0.2294 0.0172 0.1275 0.1745
Notes: Robust t-statistics in parentheses. Instruments for the IV regressions include log population and log land area. Significance is defined as: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,* p<0.1.
Table 3.10: Cross-National Growth Regressions (Human Capital = Barro and Lee (2011) Total Schooling)
Dependent Variable: Growth Rate of GDP per Capita Dependent Variable: Growth Rate of GDP per Capita  
1992-20003 1994-2003
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Figure 3.1: How IMPY Varies Over Time 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Relationship Between Per-Capita GDP and IMPY (2003) 
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Figure 3.3: IMPY Over Time for Selected Countries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4: IMPY Over Time for Natural-Resource Abundant Countries 
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Figure 3.5: Deviations from Cross-National Norm for IMPY (Human Capital Measure = 
Penn World Tables Human Capital Index) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.6: Deviations from Cross-National Norm for IMPY (Human Capital Measure = 
Barro and Lee (2011) Total Schooling) 
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Appendices
A Chapter 1 Appendix
A.1 Countries Utilized in Data
Table A.1 provides a list of the 47 countries that are included in the data set. There are
35 countries in which data was available for both the pre- and post-intervention periods.
Data for an additional 12 countries (denoted with an asterisk (*)) were added to the post-
intervention period.
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Notes: An asterisk (*) indicates countries that were added to the data after the post-intervention
period (1940-2000). All other countries were available for both the pre- and post- intervention
periods (1900-1940 and 1940-2000).
United States
Pakistan*
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Philippines*
Portugal
Spain
Sri Lanka*
Switzerland
Thailand*
United Kingdom
Mexico
Myanmar*
Netherlands
New Zealand
Nicaragua*
Norway
India*
Indonesia*
Ireland
Italy
Venezuela
Sweden
Uruguay
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Guatemala
Honduras*
China
Colombia
Costa Rica
Denmark
Ecuador*
El Salvador*
Austria
Bangladesh
Belgium
Brazil
Canada
Chile
Table A.1: List of Countries Included in the Dataset
Korea, RepublicArgentina
Australia Malaysia*
110
B Chapter 2 Appendix
B.1 Mathematical Appendix
B.1.1 Proof of A Unique Solution to the OLG Model (Equations (3.1) - (3.11))
Using the intertemporal budget constraint (equation 2.6), and assuming individuals smooth
consumption (Ct+1 =Ct+2):
(ct+1)+
(pt+1)
(Rt+2)
(ct+2) = etht lt+1wt+1 (B.1)
Using equations (2.6), (2.8), and (2.11):
(ct+2)−σ (Rt+2) = (ct+1)−σ
(ct+1) = (ct+2)(Rt+2)−
1
σ
Substituting into equation (B.1):
ct+1+(
pt+1
Rt+2
)( ct+1
(Rt+2)−
1
σ
) = etht lt+1wt+1
ct+1(1+
pt+1
(Rt+2)1−
1
σ
) = etht lt+1wt+1
ct+1 =
etht lt+1wt+1
1+(pt+1)(Rt+2)
1
σ−1
(B.2)
Using the first-order conditions for education (et) (equation 2.7) and labor supply (lt+1)
(equation 2.10):
(1− et)−σ = λt+1ht lt+1wt+1 (B.3)
(1− et)−σ = [ etht lt+1wt+1
1+(pt+1)(Rt+2)
1
σ −1
]−σ [ht lt+1wt+1]
(1− et) = [ etht lt+1wt+1
1+(pt+1)(Rt+2)
1
σ −1
][ht lt+1wt+1]−
1
σ
(1+(pt+1)(Rt+2)
1
σ −1
(ht lt+1wt+1)−
1
σ
) = (et)+(etht lt+1wt+1)
111
(et)(1+ht lt+1wt+1) =
1+(pt+1)(Rt+2)
1
σ −1
(ht lt+1wt+1)−
1
σ
et = [
1+(pt+1)(Rt+2)
1
σ −1
(ht lt+1wt+1)−
1
σ
][1+ht lt+1wt+1]
et = [1+(ht)
σ−1
σ (lt+1)
σ−1
σ (wt+1)
σ−1
σ (1+(pt+1)(Rt+2))−1]−1
et =
1+(pt+1)(Rt+2)
1
σ−1
1+(ht)
σ−1
σ (lt+1)
σ−1
σ (wt+1)
σ−1
σ
(B.4)
Using the first-order conditions for fertility (nt+1) (equation 2.9) and labor supply (lt+1)
(equation 2.10):
(nt+1)−σ = (v)(λt+1ethtwt+1) (B.5)
(nt+1)−σ = (v)(λt+1ethtwt+1)
(nt+1)−σ = (v)[ etht lt+1wt+1
1+(pt+1)(Rt+2)
1
σ −1
]−σ [ethtwt+1]
(nt+1)−σ = (v)
e1−σt h1−σt w1−σt+1 l
−σ
t+1
[1+(pt+1)(Rt+2)
1
σ −1]−σ
nt+1 =
(v)−
1
σ (ht+1)
σ−1
σ (lt+1)(wt+1)
σ−1
σ
[1+(pt+1)(Rt+2)
1
σ−1]
(B.6)
Using equation (B.6) to express lt+1 as a function of nt+1, and substituting this function
into equation (2.9), I get a single equation in terms of nt+1, which is fundamental for my
purposes:
n−σt+1 = v[1− vnt+1− (nt+1)[1+(pt+1)(Rt+2)
1
σ −1]−σ
v−
1
σ e
σ−1
σ
t h
σ−1
σ
t w
σ−1
σ
t+1
]−σ
Let
Φ= [1+(pt+1)(Rt+2)
1
σ−1]−σ
n−σt+1 = v[1− vnt+1− v
1
σΦt+2w
1
σ−1
t+1 e
1
σ−1
t h
1
σ−1
t nt+1]−σ
n−σt+1 = v[1− vnt+1− v
1
σΦt+2w
1
σ−1
t+1 h
1
σ−1
t+1 nt+1]
−σ (B.7)
112
It is clear that a unique solution in (et , ct+1, nt+1, lt+1, ct+2), all strictly positive, to the
system exists from this equation. On the interval (0,nt+1), the left-hand side of equation
(B.7) is a strictly decreasing function from infinity to n−σt+1 while the right-hand side is a
strictly increasing function from v to infinity. Therefore, they should be equal at a single
point comprised in the interval (0,nt+1), which proves the existence of a unique solution
for this system.
B.1.2 Mathematical Equations for Labor Supply
Combining equations (B.4), (B.5), (B.6) yields a single equation for labor supply, (lt+1):
1− (lt+1)− (lt+1)[(1+ vσ−1σ )(1+w
σ−1
σ
t+1 h
σ−1
σ
t l
σ−1
σ
t
1
1+(pt+1)(Rt+2)
1
σ−1
)
1−σ
σ
w
σ−1
σ
t+1 h
σ−1
σ
t
1
1+(pt+1)(Rt+2)
1
σ−1
] = 0 (B.8)
To simplify, let
Γ= w
σ−1
σ
t+1 h
σ−1
σ
t (B.9)
and
Ω=
1
1+(pt+1)(Rt+2)
1
σ−1
(B.10)
Using equations (B.9) and (B.10) and substituting:
1− (lt+1)− (lt+1)1+ vσ−1σ )(1+Γl
σ−1
σ
t+1 Ω)
1−σ
σ ΓΩ= 0 (B.11)
Through numerical iteration (using the Newton-Raphson method), the comparative statics
can be numerically proofed:
dlt+1
dpt+1
> 0 if σ > 0 (B.12)
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dlt+1
dwt+1
> 0 if 0 < σ < 1 (B.13)
dlt+1
dwt+1
< 0 if σ > 1 (B.14)
B.1.3 Mathematical Equations for Fertility
Using the first-order conditions for fertility (nt+1) (equation 2.9):
n−σt+1 = v(1− vnt+1− lt+1)−σ (B.15)
nt+1 = v−
1
σ (1− vnt+1− lt+1)
nt+1
v−
1
σ
= 1− vnt+1− lt+1
lt+1 = 1− vnt+1−nt+1v 1σ (B.16)
Combining equations (B.8) and (B.16) yields a single equation for fertility, (nt+1):
1− (1− vnt+1− v 1σ nt+1)[[(w
σ−1
σ
t+1 h
σ−1
σ
t
1
1+(pt+1)(Rt+2)
1
σ−1
)
(1+w
σ−1
σ
t+1 h
σ−1
σ
t (1− vnt+1− v
1
σ nt+1)
σ−1
σ
1
1+(pt+1)(Rt+2)
1
σ−1
)
1−σ
σ (1+ v
σ−1
σ )]+1] = 0
(B.17)
Using equations (B.9) and (B.10) to simplify:
1− (1− vnt+1− v 1σ nt+1)[[ΓΩ(1+Γ(1− vnt+1− v 1σ nt+1)σ−1σ Ω) 1−σσ (1+ vσ−1σ )]+1] = 0
(B.18)
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Through numerical iteration (using the Newton-Raphson method), the comparative statics
can be numerically proofed:
dnt+1
dpt+1
< 0 if σ > 0 (B.19)
dnt+1
dwt+1
< 0 if 0 < σ < 1 (B.20)
dnt+1
dwt+1
> 0 if σ > 1 (B.21)
B.1.4 Mathematical Equations for Education
Using the first-order condition for education (et) (equation 2.7):
(1− et)−σ = λt+1ht lt+1wt+1 (B.22)
(1− et)−σ = ( etht lt+1wt+1
1+(pt+1)(Rt+2)
1
σ −1
)−σht lt+1wt+1
(1− et)−σ (1+(pt+1)(Rt+2) 1σ−1)−σ = (etht lt+1wt+1)−σht lt+1wt+1
(1− et)−σ (1+(pt+1)(Rt+2) 1σ−1)−σ = l1−σt+1 (ethtwt+1)−σhtwt+1
(1− et)−σ (1+(pt+1)(Rt+2) 1σ−1)−σ )
1
1−σ = lt+1(et)−
σ
1−σ (htwt+1)
lt+1 = [
(1−et)(1+(pt+1)(Rt+2)
1
σ −1)
(et)
− σ1−σ (htwt+1)
]−
σ
1−σ
lt+1 = [
(1− et)(1+(pt+1)(Rt+2) 1σ−1)
(et)(wt+1)
σ−1
σ (ht)
σ−1
σ
]
σ
σ−1 (B.23)
Combining equations (B.6), (B.8), and (B.23) yields a single equation for education, et :
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[1− [(1− et)(1+ pt+1)(Rt+2)
1
σ−1
etw
σ−1
σ
t+1 h
σ−1
σ
t
]
σ
σ−1 ][1+(1+ v
σ−1
σ )
(w
σ−1
σ
t+1 h
σ−1
σ
t
1
1+(pt+1)(Rt+2)
1
σ−1
e
σ−1
σ
t ] = 0 (B.24)
Using equations (B.9) and (B.10) to simplify:
1− [(1− et)(Ω)
−1
etΓ
]
σ
σ−1 ][1+(1+ v
σ−1
σ )(Γ)(Ω)(e
σ−1
σ
t ) = 0 (B.25)
Through numerical iteration (using the Newton-Raphson method), the comparative statics
can be numerically proofed:
det
dpt
> 0 if σ > 0 (B.26)
det
dwt+1
> 0 if 0 < σ < 1 (B.27)
det
dwt+1
< 0 if σ > 1 (B.28)
B.1.5 Proof of Proposition 1
Begin with equation (B.7) to show the change in response to fertility, (nt+1):
n−σt+1 = v[1− vnt+1− v
1
σΦt+2w
1
σ−1
t+1 h
1
σ−1
t+1 nt+1]
−σ
where Φt+2 = [1+(pt+1)(R
1
σ−1
t+2 )]
−σ
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It is simple to see that a change in pt+1 affects only the right-hand side of the above
equation. Because the left-hand side is unaffected, and the right-hand side is increasing in
nt+1, in order to offset a decrease in survival probability, (pt+1), fertility must increase.
Likewise, the same argument can be made for the other decision variables. To show the
change in response to labor supply, (lt+1), combine equations (2.9) and (B.7):
1
Φσt+2
h1−σt+1 w
1−σ
t+1 l
−σ
t+1 = (v)[1− v
1
σ [
h
σ−1
σ
t+1 w
σ−1
σ
t+1 lt+1
Φt+2
− lt+1]−σ (B.29)
Unlike equation (B.7), both sides of equation (B.29) are affected by a drop in survival
probability. The left-hand side of the function is decreasing in lt+1 which suggests that
lt+1 must also decrease to reestablish the equation for an unchanged right-hand side. Thus,
a decreases in the survival probability will cause the right-hand side to move up through
the Φt+2 term which induces an additional decrease in lt+1. Therefore, for any negative
changes in pt+1, labor supply must decrease.
To show the comparative statics of savings, combine equations (2.5) and (B.2):
st+1 =
pt+1R
1
σ−1
t+2
1+ pt+1R
1
σ−1
t+2
ht+1lt+1wt+1 (B.30)
When the survival probability decreases, it follows that savings must also decrease. As
seen in the previous case above, labor supply diminishes when there is a drop in survival
probability. Since fewer individuals are working, the overall available resources in the
country is reduced. Secondly, equation (B.30) is an increasing function of pt+1 for a given
interest rate. Since middle-aged individuals only save to consume in their old-age, lower
survival rates imply that their incentive to save has decreased. Thus, savings will decrease
with a drop in survival probability.
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B.1.6 Proof of Proposition 2
To show how optimal fertility changes, begin with equation (B.7):
n−σt+1 = v[1− vnt+1− v
1
σΦt+2w
1
σ−1
t+1 h
1
σ−1
t+1 nt+1]
−σ
It is straightforward to see the impact of rising wages on fertility. The left-hand side
of the equation is unaffected by wages while the right-hand side is. The direction and
magnitude of the wage increase is entirely caused by σ . If σ > 1, an increase in the wage
will cause the right-hand side of the equation to decrease, which requires an increase in
fertility in order to rebalance the equation. The opposite is true if σ < 1.
To show how optimal labor supply changes, begin with equation (B.30):
1
Φ−σt+2
h1−σt+1 w
1−σ
t+1 l
−σ
t+1 = (v)[1− v
1
σ [
h
σ−1
σ
t+1 w
σ−1
σ
t+1 lt+1
Φt+2
− lt+1]−σ
Unlike the previous case, both sides of the equation are affected by changes in the wage.
Assume first that the wage is increasing with σ > 1. The left-hand side is shifted downward,
which induces labor supply to decrease in order to reestablish the equality (since the left-
hand side is decreasing in lt+1). On the right-hand side of the equation, the term is shifted
upwards, which again induces a further decrease in labor supply since this side is increasing
in lt+1. Thus, labor supply decreases when wages increase when σ > 1. The opposite will
be true if σ < 1.
To show how optimal fertility and labor supply react to changes in the interest rate,
begin with:
Φt+2 = [1+(pt+1)(R
1
σ−1
t+2 )]
−σ
It can be shown that increases in the interest rate, (Rt+2), lead to increases in Φt+2 if
and only if σ > 1. To show the comparative statics in fertility and labor supply, note that
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pt+1 and Rt+2 have the same effect on Φt+2 when σ > 1. In this case, increases in the
interest rate increase Φt+2 which generate the same effects on fertility and labor supply as
does decreasing the survival probability. By Proposition 2, and reversing its contents, there
must be a increase in fertility and a decrease in labor supply. Once again, if σ < 1, the
results will be reversed.
B.2 Countries and Surveys Utilized in Data
Table B.1 lists the 113 Demographic and Health Surveys from the 36 Sub-Saharan African
countries utilized in the creation of the variables and in the regressions. An asterisk (*)
next to the survey year indicates that sibling histories were available and were used in the
adult mortality calculation. Data sets are available online from the The Demographic and
Health Surveys Program website at www.dhsprogram.com.
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Country Survey Years Number of Survey Years
Benin 1996*, 2001, 2006*, 2011-2012 4
Burkina Faso 1993, 1998-1999*, 2003*, 2010* 4
Burundi 1987, 2010* 2
Cameroon 1991, 1998*, 2004*, 2011* 4
Central African Republic 1994-1995* 1
Chad 1996-1997*, 2004* 2
Comoros 1996, 2012 2
Republic of the Congo 
(Brazzaville)
2005*, 2011-2012* 2
Democratic Republic of 
the Congo  (Kinshasa)
2007*, 2013-2014 2
Cote d'Ivoire 1994*, 1998-1999, 2011-2012* 3
Ethiopia 2000*, 2005*, 2011* 3
Gabon 2000*, 2012* 2
Gambia 2013 1
Ghana 1988, 1993, 1998, 2003, 2008, 2014 6
Guinea 1999*, 2005*, 2012* 3
Kenya 1989, 1993, 1998*, 2003*, 2008-2009* 5
Lesotho 2004*, 2009* 2
Liberia 1986, 2007*, 2013 3
Madagascar 1992*, 1997*, 2003-2004*, 2008-2009* 4
Malawi 1992*, 2000*, 2004*, 2010* 4
Mali 1987, 1995-1996*, 2001*, 2006*, 2012-2013* 5
Mozambique 1997*, 2003*, 2011* 3
Namibia 1992*, 2000*, 2006-2007*, 2013 4
Niger 1992*, 1998, 2006*, 2012* 4
Nigeria 1990, 2003, 2008*, 2013 4
Rwanda 1992, 2000*, 2005*, 2010* 4
Sao Tome and Principe 2008-2009* 1
Senegal 1986, 1992-1993*, 1997, 1999, 2005*, 2010-2011* 6
Sierra Leone 2008*, 2013 2
South Africa 1998* 1
Sudan 1989-1990 1
Swaziland 2006-2007* 1
Tanzania 1991-1992, 1996*, 1999, 2004-2005*, 2010* 5
Togo 1988, 1998*, 2013-2014 3
Zambia 1992, 1996*, 2001-2002*, 2007*, 2013-2014 5
Zimbabwe 1988, 1994*, 1999*, 2005-2006, 2010-2011* 5
Notes: In total, the panel dataset consists of 113 surveys from 36 SSA countries. A "*" next to the year indicates that the
survey has sibling histories and is used in the adult mortality calculations. In all of the surveys listed, sibling histories are 
over 95% complete.
Table B.1: List of Countries and Surveys Used in the Dataset
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B.3 Construction of Data and Key Variables
B.3.1 Calculation of Age-Specific Birth Rates
Age-specific birth rates are constructed using the replies female respondents provide in the
DHS questionnaire. It is defined as the number of births per 1000 women of a specified
age in a country divided by the total number of women in the same country for a given year
multiplied by 1000. For example, to find the birth rate of 25-year old women in Benin in
1980, I divide the number of births to 25-year old women by the total number of women
in the sample (regardless of giving birth or not) at age 25 in Benin for the time period in
1980. I multiply this result by 1000 to provide birth rates per 1000 women.
B.3.2 Calculation of Age-Specific Death Rates
Age-specific death rates (per 1000 population) are constructed using the answers respon-
dents provide in the DHS questionnaire. It is defined as the total number of deaths of a
specified age in a country divided by the population of the same age in the same country
multiplied by 1000. As mentioned before in the Description of the Data section, I utilize
birth histories and sibling histories in order to calculate age-specific death rates due to the
potential biases that may occur and the lack of reliable data. When the annual number of
observations is small (less than 30), these calculations may lead to death rates that are too
unstable or unreliable for analysis. To eliminate this noise and volatility across the time
dimension, I calculate death rates by taking five-year averages. For example, to find the
mortality rate of 25-year old individuals in 1980 in Benin, I divide the number of 25-year
old siblings who died in between the years 1978 and 1982 in Benin by the number of 25-
year old siblings still alive between 1978 and 1982. Use of multiple surveys matched on the
regions increases the birth and sibling history information, which increases the robustness
of death rate computations.
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B.3.3 Calculation of Life Expectancy at Birth
Life expectancies are constructed using the age-specific death rates as calculated in the
above section. It is defined as the number of years an individual is expected to live if the
prevailing patterns of mortality at the time of the individual’s birth were to stay the same
throughout his/her life. Life expectancies are typically calculated using life tables, where
one can calculate the probability of surviving to each age. For example, if 5 percent of a
group of siblings who are alive at age 25 in the year 1980 die before reaching age 26 in
1981, then the age-specific death probability at age 25 in 1980 would be 5 percent. Life
expectancy at age a is then calculated by adding up the survival probabilities at each age.
The following formula (which is based on the life table calculations) is used for the
calculation of life expectancy:
e(a−b) = (
b
∑
t=a,a+1,...
(t+1/2)∗ (
t−1
∑
t=a
(1−qt))∗qt)+b∗ (
b−1
∑
t=a
(1−qt))∗ (1−qt)−a
which measures the expected years of life between ages a and b conditional on survival
to age a. The term qt is the mortality rate for individuals aged t. Assuming that individuals
live for half a year at their final age, 0.5 is added to each year. Finally, the term a needs to
be subtracted from the summations because the equation gives the life expectancy beyond
age a.
C Chapter 3 Appendix
C.1 Countries Utilized in Data
Table C.1 provides a list of countries that is utilized in our data set, something vitally
important that is missing from Hausmann, Hwang, and Rodrik’s (2007) paper. Country
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usage was based upon data availability from the United Nations COMTRADE Database as
well as the World Development Indicators (WDI).
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Albania Dominica Kyrgyz Republic Russian Federation
Algeria Dominican Republic Latvia Rwanda
Antigua and Barbuda Ecuador Lebanon Samoa
Argentina Egypt, Arab Rep. Lesotho Saudi Arabia
Armenia El Salvador Lithuania Senegal
Australia Estonia Luxembourg Sierra Leone
Austria Ethiopia(excludes Eritrea) Macao Singapore
Azerbaijan Fiji Macedonia, FYR Slovak Republic
Bahamas, The Finland Madagascar Slovenia
Bahrain France Malawi South Africa
Bangladesh French Polynesia Malaysia Spain
Barbados Gabon Mali Sri Lanka
Belarus Gambia, The Malta St. Kitts and Nevis
Belgium Georgia Mauritius St. Lucia
Belize Germany Mexico St. Vincent and the Grenadines
Benin Ghana Moldova Sudan
Bolivia Greece Mongolia Swaziland
Bosnia and Herzegovina Grenada Morocco Sweden
Botswana Guatemala Mozambique Switzerland
Brazil Guinea Namibia Syrian Arab Republic
Bulgaria Guyana Nepal Tanzania
Burkina Faso Haiti Netherlands Thailand
Burundi Honduras New Caledonia Togo
Cameroon Hong Kong, China New Zealand Trinidad and Tobago
Canada Hungary Nicaragua Turkey
Cape Verde Iceland Niger Turkmenistan
Central African Republic India Nigeria Uganda
Chile Indonesia Norway Ukraine
China Iran, Islamic Rep. Oman United Kingdom
Colombia Ireland Pakistan United States
Comoros Israel Panama Uruguay
Congo, Rep. Italy Papua New Guinea Vanuatu
Costa Rica Jamaica Paraguay Venezuela
Cote d'Ivoire Japan Peru Zambia
Croatia Jordan Philippines Zimbabwe
Cyprus Kazakhstan Poland
Czech Republic Kenya Portugal
Denmark Korea, Rep. Romania
Table C.1: List of Countries Included in the Dataset
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C.2 Replication Results from Hausmann, Hwang, and Rodrik (2007)
This appendix shows the replication results from select tables and figures from Hausmann,
Hwang, and Rodrick (2007). Since replication of this paper is an essential part of our
methodology, we feel it is necessary to include these results in order to confirm our tech-
niques. Despite the lack of transparency of both data and methods used by the authors, we
were able to reverse-engineer the processes and we feel that the replication results obtained
are more than sufficient to reaffirm out own approaches. Although many values and statis-
tics do not fully match with their paper, the range of values does not vary significantly, and
we are more than comfortable with the replication results and methodology. Thus, when we
substitute imports for exports in our measures of PRODY and IMPY, we are still following
a very similar, if not the exact, process that the authors use.
Tables C.2-C.7 replicate Tables 1-6, respectively. Since we use two measures of human
capital (Penn World Tables Human Capital Index and Barro and Lee’s (2011) measure of
total schooling), we have two different specifications for the next two tables. Tables C.8
and C.9 duplicate Table 7 while Tables C.10 and C.11 reproduce Table 8. Similarly, Figures
C.1-C.6 replicate Figures 3-7, with Figures C.5 and C.6 providing the two specifications for
the human capital measure. Further details about the replication process and methodology
as well as the data sources is provided in the body of the main paper.
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Variable Number of Observations Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
Mean PRODY, 
1999-2001, 
PPP-Adjusted
5,026 13,401 5,911 692 48,804
Product
Smallest 530410
140490
10120
80130
90700
Largest 730110
721633
721060
590290
391810
Table C.2: Sample Size of EXPY
Table C.4 Largest and Smallest Export PRODY Values (2000 US$)
Number of Reporting Countries
48
65
87
99
111
119
119
126
Cloves (whole fruit, cloves and stems)
Sheet piling of iron or steel
903
48,805
Table C.3: Descriptive Statistics for Export PRODY (2000 US$)
Sections, H, iron or non-alloy steel, 
nfw hot-roll/drawn/extruded > 80m
Flat rolled iron or non-alloy steel, 
coated with aluminium, width>600mm
Tyre cord fabric of viscose rayon
Floor, wall, ceiling cover, roll, tile, 
vinyl chlorid
47,503
46,251
45,117
43,596
2001
2002
2003
133
133
127
122
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
Year
1992
1993
1994
1995
Product Name
Sisal and Agave, raw
Vegetable products nes
Asses, mules and hinnies, live
Cashew nuts, fresh or dried
Mean PRODY, 1999-
2001
693
699
824
891
126
Year Number of Observations Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
1992 48 12,672 3,997 5,402 19,926
1993 65 12,060 4,130 3,346 19,546
1994 87 11,593 4,126 2,890 19,569
1995 99 10,802 4,428 2,252 19,030
1996 111 10,636 4,235 2,755 19,392
1997 119 10,553 4,253 2,188 18,982
1998 119 10,788 4,502 2,226 19,471
1999 126 10,869 4,646 2,161 25,142
2000 133 10,413 4,256 2,089 24,212
2001 133 10,334 4,176 2,404 23,545
2002 127 10,610 4,232 2,780 23,571
2003 122 10,350 3,811 2,566 22,238
Increase
Decrease
EXPY
Smallest 2,404
2,595
2,739
2,917
2,963
Largest 23,454
18,402
17,872
17,728
17,622
Table C.5: Descriptive Statistics for EXPY (2000 US$)
Table C.7: Countries with Smallest and Largest EXPYs
Table C.6: Number of Countries that Show an Increase/Decrease in EXPY, 1992-2003
EXPY, ppp
7
French Polynesia
Reporter
Niger
Ethiopia (Excluding Eritrea)
Burundi
Guinea
Benin
38
Luxembourg
Switzerland
Ireland
Germany
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log GDP per Capita
0.3507***
(17.65)
0.2700***
(8.16)
0.2579***
(5.78)
0.2423***
(5.76)
Log Human Capital
0.3592***
(2.88)
0.3605***
(2.89)
0.3636***
(3.00)
Rule of Law Index
0.0289
(0.72)
0.0468
(1.20)
Log Population
0.0550***
(2.92)
Log Land Area
-0.0150
(-1.09)
Constant
6.096***
(35.01)
6.514***
(30.68)
6.684***
(21.10)
6.034***
(16.33)
Observations 131 114 114 114
R-Squared 0.7071 0.7541 0.7552 0.7769
Robust t-statistics in parentheses. Significance is defined as: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,* p<0.1.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log GDP per Capita
0.3507***
(17.65)
0.3164***
(10.60)
0.2743***
(6.20)
0.2625***
(6.15)
Log Human Capital
0.0891
(1.30)
0.1085
(1.57)
0.1138*
(1.71)
Rule of Law Index
0.0466
(1.14)
0.0676*
(1.70)
Log Population
0.0524***
(2.84)
Log Land Area
-0.0101
(-0.76)
Constant
6.096***
(35.01)
6.240***
(33.56)
6.5675***
(20.73)
5.9317***
(15.55)
Observations 131 111 109 109
R-Squared 0.7071 0.7384 0.7450 0.7702
Robust t-statistics in parentheses. Significance is defined as: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,* p<0.1.
Table C.8: Correlates of EXPY  (Human Capital = Penn World Tables Human Capital Index)
Dependent Variable: Log EXPY (2001)
Table C.9: Correlates of EXPY  (Human Capital = Barro and Lee (2011) Total Schooling)
Dependent Variable: Log EXPY (2001)
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OLS OLS OLS IV IV IV OLS OLS OLS IV IV IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Log Initial GDP per Capita
-0.0166
(-3.16)***
-0.0238
(-3.81)***
-0.0263
(-3.58)***
-0.0188
(-2.36)**
-0.0291
(-3.30)***
-0.0313
(-3.56)***
-0.0100
(-2.49)**
-0.0148
(-3.39)***
-0.0194
(-3.95)***
-0.0082
(-1.99)**
-0.0206
(-2.65)***
-0.0243
(-3.34)***
Log Initial EXPY
0.0599
(4.08)***
0.0574
(3.75)***
0.0524
(2.78)***
0.0675
(2.69)***
0.0764
(2.78)***
0.0761
(2.43)**
0.0367
(3.74)***
0.0291
(2.73)***
0.0241
(2.20)**
0.0304
(2.24)**
0.0538
(1.83)*
0.0482
(1.65)*
Log Human Capital
0.0425
(2.19)**
0.0368
(1.66)*
0.0403
(0.0190)**
0.0381
(1.81)*
0.0342
(2.24)**
0.0260
(1.68)*
0.0208
(0.97)
0.0156
(0.81)
Log Capital-Labor Ratio
-0.0062
(-0.51)
-0.0076
(-0.65)
-0.0039
(-0.40)
-0.0073
(-0.71)
Rule of Law Index
0.0050
(0.88)
0.0024
(0.40)
0.0094
(2.29)**
0.0076
(1.67)*
Constant
-0.3962
(-3.86)***
-0.3478
(-3.21)***
-0.2816
(-1.85)*
-0.4470
(-2.61)***
-0.4775
(-2.52)**
-0.4621
(-1.90)*
-0.2239
(-3.67)***
-0.1522
(-2.02)**
-0.0635
(-0.73)
-0.1916
(-1.24)
-0.3193
(-1.60)
-0.2392
(-1.11)
F-Statistic on Instruments
(First Stage)
10.03 8.08 8.38 6.72 5.56 5.46
Sargan-Hansen J-Statistic p-Value 0.8304 0.8086 0.7695 0.1268 0.2684 0.4333
Number of Observations 46 44 42 46 44 42 85 77 75 84 77 75
R
2 0.2817 0.3418 0.3462 0.2773 0.3164 0.3367 0.1605 0.2268 0.259 0.1599 0.1699 0.2065
Notes: Robust t-statistics in parentheses. Instruments for the IV regressions include log population and log land area. Significance is defined as: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,* p<0.1.
Table C.10: Cross-National Growth Regressions (Human Capital = Penn World Tables Human Capital Index)
Dependent Variable: Growth Rate of GDP per Capita Dependent Variable: Growth Rate of GDP per Capita  
1994-20031992-20003
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OLS OLS OLS IV IV IV OLS OLS OLS IV IV IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Log Initial GDP per Capita
-0.0166
(-3.16)***
-0.0253
(-4.30)***
-0.0295
(-4.33)***
-0.0188
(-2.36)**
-0.0326
(-3.68)***
-0.0354
(-4.35)***
-0.0100
(-2.49)**
-0.0146
(-3.50)***
-0.0207
(-4.23)***
-0.0082
(-1.99)**
-0.2192
(-2.89)***
-0.0270
(-3.98)***
Log Initial EXPY
0.0599
(4.08)***
0.0565
(3.83)***
0.0399
(2.07)**
0.0675
(2.69)***
0.0819
(2.98)***
0.0785
(2.19)**
0.0367
(3.74)***
0.0259
(2.56)**
0.0178
(1.71)*
0.0304
(2.24)**
0.0556
(2.03)**
0.0520
(1.93)*
Log Human Capital
0.0380
(2.82)***
0.308
(2.01)*
0.0376
(2.830***
0.0358
(2.31)**
0.0262
(2.64)***
0.0239
(2.44)**
0.0163
(1.22)
0.0150
(1.24)
Log Capital-Labor Ratio
-0.0057
(-0.50)
-0.0084
(-0.74)
-0.0012
(-0.13)
-0.0060
(-0.60)
Rule of Law Index
0.0100
(1.59)
0.0037
(0.46)
0.0109
(2.64)***
0.0074
(1.50)
Constant
-0.3962
(-3.86)***
-0.3648
(-3.50)***
-0.1661
(-0.98)
-0.4470
(-2.61)***
-0.5389
(-2.83)***
-0.4871
(-1.60)
-0.2339
(-3.67)***
-0.1459
(-2.15)**
-0.0168
(-0.20)
-0.1917
(-1.24)
-0.3374
(-1.90)
-0.2644
(-1.34)
F-Statistic on Instruments
(First Stage)
10.03 7.40 6.40 6.72 5.97 6.32
Sargan-Hansen J-Statistic p-Value 0.8304 0.5444 0.5515 0.1268 0.4030 0.5937
Number of Observations 46 43 41 46 43 41 85 75 73 84 75 73
R
2 0.2817 0.3719 0.3891 0.2773 0.3241 0.3391 0.1605 0.2297 0.2732 0.1599 0.1665 0.2173
Notes: Robust t-statistics in parentheses. Instruments for the IV regressions include log population and log land area. Significance is defined as: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,* p<0.1.
Table C.11: Cross-National Growth Regressions (Human Capital = Barro and Lee (2011) Total Schooling)
Dependent Variable: Growth Rate of GDP per Capita Dependent Variable: Growth Rate of GDP per Capita  
1992-20003 1994-2003
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Figure C.1: How EXPY Varies Over Time 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure C.2: Relationship Between Per-Capita GDP and EXPY (2003) 
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Figure C.3: EXPY Over Time for Selected Countries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure C.4: EXPY Over Time for Natural-Resource Exporting Countries 
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Figure C.5: Deviations from Cross-National Norm for EXPY (Human Capital = 
Penn World Tables Human Capital Index) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure C.6: Deviations from Cross-National Norm for EXPY (Human Capital 
Measure = Barro and Lee (2011) Total Schooling) 
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